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Whoever fights with monsters should take care that in the process
he does not become a monster.
-Friedrich Nietzsche'
Introduction
Think of the following three terms: drug dealer, child molester,
and violent crime. In the abstract, each term is usually taken to refer
to the most monstrous offense and offender possible. The term "drug
dealer" conjures up an image of an Uzi-toting, gold-chain wearing,
remorseless urban predator. The term "child molester" elicits images
of a strange man who cruises playgrounds in the hope of luring
unattended children into his van, where he commits kidnapping, rape,
murder, or all three. "Violent crime" triggers thoughts of a vicious
assault, if not a rape or robbery involving a weapon. In each case, the
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1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA (Thomas Common trans.,
Promethus Books 1993) (1883-85).
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linguistic category used to describe crime and criminals evokes images
of the most serious offenses and offenders. Such offenders do exist,
but there are nowhere near as many of them as society imagines, and
they constitute a tiny fraction of the actual population of offenders
prosecuted. The monstrous images evoked simply do not correspond
with the average offender included in the legal category of offense to
which the term refers. For example, most "violent crimes" are simple
batteries which involve no physical injury, most injuries sustained in
such cases do not require medical treatment, and most cases requiring
medical treatment do not require hospitalization.2 Similarly, the
average offender convicted for drug sales is probably a drug user who
sells two rocks of crack cocaine in the hope of clearing enough to be
able to smoke a third himself,3 and the average "child molester" is not
a stranger but a household member who molests without kidnapping
or raping.4 Why are we so preoccupied with the worst case? Why are
we so eager to believe in monsters?
Monstrous crimes and monstrous criminals provide appetizing
fare for a society hungry for agreement and cohesion. Individuals in
our society attempt to forge solidarity through the process of
punishment by focusing on the worst possible offenses and offenders.
Simply put, we exaggerate the worst in order to experience the best:
moments when we feel as a society that we have transcended the
many differences that keep us apart. My primary thesis is that the
changes, divisions, and tremors in our social and economic structure
over the last several decades and the anxieties which they have
produced about social solidarity have manifested themselves both in
the way we speak and think about crime and in the hyper
punitiveness of our criminal justice practices as well. Crime has
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 18-19, 22-23,75-76,79-80 (2000)).
3. "[O]f the more than 150,000 drug offenders incarcerated in state prisons in 1991
[a]lmost 127,000 of these offenders, or 84 percent, had no history of a prior incarceration
for a violent crime, and one half of the offenders had no prior incarcerations at all. One
third of the drug offenders sentenced to state prison had been convicted of the less serious
possession offenses." MARC MAUER, RACE To INCARCERATE 157 (1999) (citing JAMES
LYNCH & WILLIAM SABOL, URBAN INSTITUTE, DID GETTING TOUGH ON CRIME PAY?
(1997)). Even in the federal system whose targets are supposedly major drug dealers, the
story is much the same. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's analysis of
defendants in crack sales in 1992, "only 5.5 percent of the defendants were classified as
high-level dealers, while 63.7 percent were considered street-level dealers.., and 30.8
percent mid-level dealers." Id. at 156 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 172 (1995)).
4. See PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC 10 (1998); see also PAULA S. FASS,
KIDNAPPED: CHILD ABDUCTION IN AMERICA 213-63 (1997).
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served as a rallying cry for a divided and insecure society, and many
in our society use the criminal justice system to send symbolic
messages reaffirming and defining core values during this time of flux.
These anxieties explain a great deal about our move toward a more
determinate form of sentencing, the increasing length of the sentences
awarded under that system, and a way of thinking which frames
society's interest in punishment exclusively in terms of minimizing the
risks of reoffense by those convicted of a crime. Criminal punishment
has come to serve as a new civic religion of sorts for a society which
worries about its ability to cohere, and the depths of our anxieties
about our social solidarity express themselves in our conceptions of
crime and in the corresponding severity of our punishment.
By any measure, the nineteen-eighties and nineties saw an
unprecedented increase in the severity of criminal punishment in the
United States.5 The percentage of the population incarcerated, the
length of sentences imposed, and the number of offenses which
carried automatic prison sentences regardless of mitigating
circumstances all increased drastically during a relatively short period
of time. The number of people in prison in the United States has
increased by almost 500% since 1972 while the population itself has
increased by only 28%.6 The number of prisons constructed in this
country from 1985 to 1995 was equivalent to a new federal or state
prison opening every week somewhere in the United States during
that ten-year period.7 Furthermore, four million Americans were on
5. A short catalogue of some of the more notable punishment measures adopted
during this time is illustrative: "Harsher sentencing and the increased use of imprisonment;
'Three Strikes' and mandatory minimum sentencing laws, 'truth in sentencing' and parole
release restrictions; no frills prisons laws and 'austere prisons'; retribution in juvenile court
and the imprisonment of children; the revival of chain gangs and corporal punishment;
boot camps and supermax-prisons; the multiplication of capital offenses and executions;
community notification laws and pedophile registers; zero tolerance policies and Anti-
Social Behavior Orders-there is now a long list of measures that appear to signify a
punitive turn in contemporary penality." David Garland, The Culture of High Crime
Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent "Law and Order" Policies, 40 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 347, 349-50 (2000) [hereinafter Garland, Culture]. See generally MAUER,
supra note 3; NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996).
6. The prison population in 1972 was just under 200,000 and the number of people in
county jails was 130,000. The prison population in 1997 was 1.2 million and the jail
population was 567,000. These figures do not include juveniles incarcerated in youth
facilities, of which there were more than 100,000 in 1997. See MAUER, supra note 3, at 1,
9,19.
7. See MAUER, supra note 3, at 19.
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probation or parole during 1998.8 Adding the almost two million
people incarcerated in 1998, 5.9 million people (3% of the
population) were under some form of correctional supervision during
that year.9 To put these numbers in perspective, the entire population
of Manhattan, New York was approximately 1.5 million in 1997, and
only thirteen of the fifty states had more than 5.9 million residents in
1997.10 This means that we have more people under criminal justice
supervision than we have living in Indiana, Washington, Missouri,
Tennessee, Wisconsin, Maryland, or any one of thirty other states and
that we currently have enough jail and prison capacity to incarcerate
every woman, man, and child in Manhattan with room to spare.
The breadth and depth of the political consensus behind these
increases in the severity of criminal sentences may be without parallel
in contemporary political history. Most, if not all, of the legislative
enactments increasing criminal sentences on both the national and
state level have commanded widespread bipartisan support."
Moreover, attempts to undo some of the more draconian features of
recent penal reforms are not considered politically feasible even
where agreement among criminal justice professionals is widespread.
For example, the Federal Courts Study Committee heard testimony
from 270 people, including prosecutors, probation officers, and
judges, on the subject of the federal sentencing guidelines. Only four
people testified in favor of the guidelines and each of the four was
associated with the Sentencing Commission that had promulgated
them, yet the guidelines remain politically untouchable. 12 The
declaration of war that followed the attack on Pearl Harbor aside, it is
hard to think of an issue where the political balance has been so one-
sided.
Ultimately, the severity revolution is best understood as an
exercise in scapegoating by people who are desperately trying to
forge a greater sense of solidarity in a time of unprecedented change
and division: Not just scapegoating in the traditional sense (the
8. See WALL ST. J. August 23, 1999, at Al (citing a report by the Department of
Justice).
9. See id.
10. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACrs 380 (1999) (citing the Bureau of the
Census).
11. See generally Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 527 (1996).
12. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS 74-75 (1996) [hereinafter TONRY,
SENTENCING]. "[T]he guidelines have few vocal proponents outside the... Sentencing
Commission... [and] objections to the guidelines transcend ideological and partisan
differences." Id. at 99.
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demonization of minorities and other outsider groups as the source of
criminal activity) but scapegoating in a subtler and more pervasive
form as well. The essence of scapegoating is the attempt to identify
the sources of social problems as external to the group, and an
analysis of some of our society's crime obsessions of the eighties and
nineties-drug use, the sexual abuse of children, random violence and
serial killers, juvenile "superpredators" -reveals a common pattern.
In each case, people eagerly believe in a populous category of
"monstrous offenders" and then project onto those offenders more
basic anxieties about social problems that are both widespread and
intractable. 13 As a result, the abstract categories of offenses in our
penal laws are tied to sentences that are disproportionately harsh for
the average offense. We have developed a draconian system of
punishment for dealing with the monsters that we have imagined
being everywhere, a system that swallows up hordes of lesser
offenders.
14
In Part I of this article I will use the theory of Emile Durkheim to
argue that people in diverse, secular societies such as our own try to
forge social solidarity through criminal punishment. Terrible crimes
provide our society with a supply of what I call shared stories of the
secular sacred, and we try to strengthen social cohesion through our
collective response to these stories. In Part II, however, I will argue
that anxieties about social solidarity have shaped punishment in two
conflicting ways: we have tried to minimize potentially divisive
controversies about the role of race in sentencing decisions by making
the visible parts of the sentencing process more determinate and less
contextual at the same time that we rely upon punishment to express
our shared values. A tension exists between determinate and
expressive punishment, however, because punishment that is truly
morally expressive must make individualized and contextual
judgments about the moral worth of each offender-his degree of
culpability for the crime he committed and his potential for
reintegration into the community. In a review of the moral panics of
the eighties and nineties, Part Ill argues that our society has
attempted to exorcise its solidarity anxieties and the tensions in
punishment which they produce by focusing on the worst types of
13. See infra Part III.
14. See TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 12, at 24 ("[T]he mechanism of the two-axis
grid and the law-and-order politics of the last two decades have too often converted
offenders into abstractions and produced a penal system of a severity unmatched in the
Western world."); see also infra Part III.
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offenses and offenders. Part IV explores how these conceptions of
crime have distorted the way we frame decisions about when to
release criminal offenders back into society: we consider only the
risks of reoffense and not the risks to society of unnecessary
incarceration. Part V relates this Durkheimian perspective to the
literature of Expressive Punishment and argues that the choice of a
sentencing process is itself expressive in a way which complicates
efforts to moderate severity in punishment. The Conclusion offers a
few brief observations about the prospects for less severe punishment
policies.
I. Solidarity and Symbolism in Modem Punishment
We have only to notice what happens particularly in a small town,
when some moral scandal has just been committed. They stop each
other on the street, they visit each other, they seek to come
together to talk of the event and to wax indignant in common.
From all the similar impressions that are exchanged, from all the
temper that gets itself expressed, there emerges a unique temper,
more or less determinate according to the circumstances, which is
everybody's without being anybody's in particular. This is the
public temper.
-Emile Durkheim15
Criminal punishment serves as a communicative realm for the
expression of sacred values within our society. Talking of the
"sacred" in societies as diverse and secular as our own, however,
raises conceptual problems for many. In this Part, I will argue that
the more diverse and the more secular a society, the greater the need
for belief in some set of core values around which the disparate
elements of our society can coalesce. These core values constitute
what I call the secular sacred, and I will further argue that the secular
sacred is most easily expressed in societies such as our own through
stories about its violation. Through punishment, society defines itself
by its response to these stories of violation. In this sense, criminal
punishment performs an internal communicative function whose
importance deepens in times of flux and acute anxiety about social
cohesion. The more we fear division in our society the more
importance we invest in stories about society's response to terrible
crimes, and this investment is reflected in the pivotal role which
"special crime stories" have played in major criminal justice reforms
15. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simpson
trans., MacMillan Co. 1933) (1893).
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over the last two decades.
The social thinker who thought most about the connection
between punishment and social solidarity was Emile Durkheim, and
in the first section of Part I, I will summarize key aspects of
Durkheim's theory of punishment drawing heavily on David
Garland's interpretion of Durkheim's writings. In the second section,
I will provide my own account of how Durkheim's theory best
translates into our contemporary context, an account which
emphasizes the importance of special crime stories in shaping and
expressing our sense of ourselves as a society.
A. Punishment and Solidarity in the Thought of Emile Durkheim
While the emphasis of the rhetoric which has accompanied
contemporary severity in punishment often emphasizes deterrence of
wrongdoers, Durkheim would most probably see the true audience of
the "message" sent by these punitive practices as the "rightdoers," the
people in society who accept the society's moral framework and who
wish to see it affirmed.16 For Durkheim, punishment's primary
function was not to "correct the culpable" or to "deter potential
wrongdoers."' 7 Punishment's core function was to maintain social
cohesion by affirming the moral order by which upright people lived
their lives. "Crime brings together upright consciences and
concentrates them."18 The punishment of crime in the Durkheimian
view provides "an occasion for the collective expression of shared
moral passions, and this collective expression serves to strengthen
these same passions through mutual reinforcement and
16. Cf Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413,
422 (1999) [hereinafter Kahan, Secret Ambition]. Kahan argues that the large role which
deterrence arguments play in public debate is misleading because the opinions of citizens
and public officials on crime policy are ultimately grounded in concerns about moral
values. See id. at 435-76. Kahan, however, seems to fear the potentially divisive
consequences of a punishment discourse about moral values. See id. at 413. ("[T]he
rhetoric of deterrence displaces an alternative expressive idiom that produces incessant
illiberal conflict over status."). Durkheim, on the other hand, celebrates the role of
punishment in expressing a society's moral framework. While I acknowledge some
potentially divisive aspects of punishment practices in Part II, I believe that Kahan is
mistaken in arguing that society is well served by the "secret ambition" of deterrence to
mask the more expressive dimensions of punishment. As I will argue in Part III, the
severity of our punishment practices are a function of anxieties about the vibrancy of our
society's shared moral framework, anxieties which are probably exacerbated by the way in
which deterrence talk mutes the expressiveness of punishment.
17. DURKHEIM, supra note 15, at 108.
18. Id. at 102.
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reassurance."1 9
Social scientists raising Durkheimian questions have found
evidence that the public's attitudes toward issues of punishment are
driven more by symbolic concerns about values than by instrumental
concerns such as the actual reduction of crime.20 Support for the
death penalty, for example, has been shown to be rooted in the
symbolism of society's willingness to provide the ultimate punishment
for the most serious crimes.21  A survey exploring support in
California for that state's Three Strikes initiative recently found that
"support for the three strikes initiative, as well as for overall
punitiveness, are linked to judgments about moral cohesion and not
to judgments about dangerousness. ' 22 A review of the main points of
Durkheim's theory of punishment provides insight into the
relationship between the severity of current punishment practices and
concerns about the solidarity of contemporary society.
At the heart of Durkheim's thought are the reciprocal
relationships that he believed existed between crime, punishment,
and moral order. "The existence of strong bonds of moral solidarity
are the conditions which cause punishments to come about, and, in
their turn, punishments result in the reaffirmation and strengthening
of these same social bonds." 23 Crime demands punishment because
crime constitutes a challenge to the moral framework of a society and
19. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 33 (1990) [hereinafter
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT]. Durkheim's main concern was how modern societies
maintained their solidarity. His work has been described as "a single-minded search for a
sociological grounding for moral bonds in societies which, to many observers, appear to
have become far too complex, chaotic, secular, and atomistic for any such moral
frameworks to exist." Roger Cotterrell, The Durkheimian Tradition in the Sociology of
Law, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 923 (1991).
20. See Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment
Reactions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF
SCARCITY AND CHANGE 145 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981).
21. See Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for The Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 21 (1982).
22. Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why?
The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 235,
237 (1997). The California study sought to specifically measure concerns about social
cohesion by asking respondents to respond to statements such as "Others in my
community have similar values to mine." Id at 235. Those who expressed concern about
things like "the decline in morality and discipline within the family and increases in the
diversity of society" were more likely to support Three Strikes than any other group. Id.
See generally TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY
(1997)(arguing that people's subjective sense of whether something was just affects their
willingness to accept results regardless of self interest).
23. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT, supra note 19, at 28.
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"the only means of affirming it is to express the unanimous aversion
which the crime continues to inspire, by an authentic act which can
consist only in suffering inflicted upon the agent."2 4 This act of
punishment creates tangible moments when a society's collective
moral framework can be experienced as real and vibrant 5
Punishment "witnesses that collective sentiments are always
collective, that the communion of spirits in the same faith rests on a
solid foundation, and accordingly, that it is repairing the evil which
the crime inflicted upon society. '26 Durkheim referred to this
phenomenon as the "expiatory character of punishment."27 Because
society experienced affirmation in this collective expression, the penal
sanction both "expressed and regenerated society's values." 28
Punishment's role in expressing and regenerating social values
means, in essence, that reasoning about direct costs and benefits
applies in only a limited way to punishment practices. Societies
punish even when the costs of punishment outweigh the direct harms
of the crime because punishment is necessary to uphold the moral
order.
In reacting to particular crimes, punishment has the task of
upholding the overarching moral order and of preventing its
erosion and collapse, so even where the costs of punishing
an offence appear greater than the direct harms caused by
it, there is always another consideration weighing in the
balance which indicates that punishment is required.2 9
In this sense, "punishment is never merely a reaction to particular
crimes and the direct harms that they cause because in addition to this
immediate crime-control function, punishment also has a system-
maintaining function which, in sociological terms, is more essential. '30
Durkheim did not pretend that all crimes threatened social
cohesion in the same way or to the same extent. He distinguished
between laws which were mere "conventions or regulations" and laws
which were "sacred prohibitions which command widespread
assent."' 31 By "sacred," Durkheim was referring to collective values
which "occupy a position of depth in our psychic organization, and
24. DURKHEIM, supra note 15, at 108.
25. See GARLAND, PUNISHMENT, supra note 19, at 22-33.
26. Id. at 68, 76.
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id- at 58.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 30.
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are thus fundamental to who we are. '32 More importantly, with
reference to social solidarity, sacred values are also incontestable
ones. "Unlike abstract ideas, to which we attach ourselves on only a
superficial level, and in which we can tolerate contradiction, these
deeper moral feelings have a force and importance which brooks no
disagreement. '33 It is this incontestable quality of the sacred which
gives punishment an essentially spontaneous quality.
To think of punishment as a calculated instrument for the rational
control of conduct is to miss its essential character, to mistake
superficial form for true content.... [T]he essence of punishment is
irrational, unthinking emotion fixed by a sense of the sacred and its
violation.... The criminal act violates sentiments and emotions
which are deeply ingrained in most members of society-it shocks
their healthy consciences-and this violation calls forth strong
psychological reactions, even among those not directly involved. It
provokes a sense of outrage, anger, indignation, and a passionate
desire for vengeance.3
4
Punishment in this sense is not a means to achieving some abstract
greater end such as public safety but a spontaneous reaction to a
transgression that moves us deeply. It is an "expressive institution-a
realm for the expression of social values and the release of psychic
energy" with no objective or goal other than itself.35
Although Durkheim developed the idea of the sacred within the
context of what he referred to as "primitive societies... where laws
and collective sentiments are clearly framed within a religious idiom
and are deemed to be shaped by divine decree," Durkheim believed
that the sacred continues to be "an essential aspect of the moral
order" of advanced, secular societies.36
32. Id.
33. Id. at 30-31.
34. Id. at 30-32.
35. Id. An "expressionist" school of punishment philosophy exists, but these thinkers
do not seem to conceive of punishment in terms of the sort of internal communicative
function that Durkheim describes. See generally Carol Steiker, Twenty-Sixth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure-Foreword- Punishment and Procedure: Punishment
Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.i. 775, 805 n.171 (1997). Jean
Hampton, for example, has described punishment as an attempt to restore the moral
worth of the victim by collective condemnation of the transgressor's acts. See Jean
Hampton, Correcting Harms vs. Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1659, 1686 (1992). Durkheim's emphasis, however, is that it is the damage to the
society's moral framework as a whole which is repaired by the act of punishment, not
merely the moral worth of the particular victim directly affected. In a sense, the victim is a
means to the end of affirming moral order for Durkheim.
36. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT, supra note 19, at 54-55.
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Despite the fact that morals are now understood-on an
intellectual plane-as being a product of social convention and
convenience, they continue to impress individuals-at least
emotionally-as being somehow elevated, supernatural, having a
power and a quality which places them on a higher plane of
existence. The attitude that is adopted towards such 'sacred'
entities is not one of everyday utilitarian calculation. They are not
simply rules like any others to be rationally understood and
instrumentally obeyed. Instead, they strike the individual as
superior to him or her, and inspire feelings of deep respect, awe,
love, and even dread.
37
For Durkheim, these secular transcendent values command the same
emotional commitments of absolute, unthinking faith in secular
societies that transcendent values in religious societies elicit.
Durkheim's concept of the secular sacred is fundamentally non-
instrumental in nature: it is not a means to a higher end but an end in
itself that defines who we are as a society.3 8
This emotional and non-utilitarian quality of the punishment role
survives the institutionalization of punishment that takes place in
modern societies. The "spontaneous social action of the outraged
community comes to be institutionalized in the form of a tribunal and
a penal apparatus, '39 but these institutions continue to draw their
authority and their power from the collective conscience which drives
punishment. The institutionalization of punishment concentrates and
channels society's collective punitive energies in important ways,
37. Id. at 55.
38. Garland acknowledges that something like the sacred may continue to play an
important role in modem societies, but he describes it in terms of the aura of sovereign
power. He sees an analogy between Durkheim's concept of the sacred and Max Weber's
concept of charisma: "the quality of extraordinary power and grace which is widely
ascribed to certain individuals or institutions." Id at 55. In a similar vein, he quotes the
anthropologist Clifford Geertz on the sacredness inherent in the power of the sovereign:
[A]t the political center of any complexly organized society.., there is both a
governing elite and a set of symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth
governing. No matter how democratically the members of the elite are
chosen.., they justify their existence and order their actions in terms of a
collection of stories, ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and opportunities. It is
these-crowns and coronations, limousines and conferences-that mark the
center as center and give what goes on there its aura of being not merely
important but in some odd fashion connected with the way the world is built.
Id. at 56 (quoting Clifford Geertz, Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the
Symbolics of Power, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY (Basic Books 1983)). Ultimately, Garland sees the sacred as an
emanation of the power practices of any society, as attaching to "those norms and rituals
of power which are crucial to a particular version of social order." Id




[T]he fact of institutionalization has important consequences. It
gives added strength to the moral order by 'realizing' it in practical
and continuing ways. It also ensures the existence of routine
procedures and formal occasions that will help evoke the proper
moral response to criminality, while simultaneously moderating the
expression of moral passions and putting them to proper use.
40
Whereas most modem theorists of punishment see the
institutionalization of punishment as "the supplanting of emotion by
calculation, rationality, and administrative forms,"41 Durkheim
believed that the energizing force behind punishment-the
individual's sense of the sacred-and the key function which
punishment spontaneously performs-the reaffirmation of the shared
moral order-survives and transcends the modem forms employed to
realize punishment in complex, modem societies. Durkheim is well
aware that many seek to control punishment, to use it as an
instrument in the service of some goal or interest. He believed,
however, that "the petty calculation of social controllers... rarely
succeed in their control and reform ambitions." 42 Even in modem,
secular societies, punishment functions as "a kind of routinized
expression of emotion, like the rituals and ceremonies of a religious
faith." 43
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id. at 35. Durkheim's ideas about punishment have often been either invoked or
associated with the ongoing debate about "expressive punishment." Much of this debate
has focused on "shaming penalties" such as forcing offenders to wear signs or be publicly
identified in some fashion. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments
Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1998) (distinguishing shaming penalties which aim to
educate from penalties which aim solely to shame and offering educative model as a way
of fulfilling punishment's expressive function without offending human dignity); Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997)
(arguing that imprisonment may sometimes be justified by something other than a
conventional cost-benefit analysis since enforcement of criminal law shapes how
individuals perceive one another's values and behavior); Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 591 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan,
Alternative Sanctions] (arguing that alternative sanctions have not supplanted
imprisonment because such sanctions are not sufficiently condemnatory to fulfill
punishment's expressive function and that shaming penalties would be expressive yet
avoid the irrationalities of unnecessary incarceration). But see Toni M. Massaro, The
Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 689
(1997) (arguing that shaming penalties give birth to a vicious cycle of shamelessness and
punishment); Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment policies in America, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1751 (1999) [hereinafter Tonry, Rethinking] (arguing that neither
empirical literature about public knowledge and opinion about punishment nor theoretical
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Durkheim's theory presupposes the existence of a widely shared
moral framework in a modern society, an assumption many have
challenged. Indeed, his work has been described as a "single-minded
search for a sociological grounding for moral bonds in societies which,
to many observers, appear to have become far too complex chaotic,
secular, and atomistic for any such moral frameworks to exist."44
Durkheim clearly believed that even modern, secular societies needed
"a shared framework of meanings and moralities" in order to
function.45 In David Garland's view, however, Durkheim's theory
work of expressivist philosophers and Durkheimian functionalists justifies "disintegrative"
quality of shaming penalties which degrade the offender and praising John Braithwaite's
paradigm of "reintegrative shaming" as logical alternative); James Q. Whitman, What Is
Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998) (arguing that the chief
evil of public humiliation sanctions is not their effect on an offender but their effect on a
society of onlookers whose punitive sensibilities will be inflamed by publicly sanctioned
shaming); but cf. Dan M. Kahan, Unthinkable Misrepresentations: A Response to Tonry, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1933 (1999) [hereinafter Kahan, Unthinkable Misrepresentations] (arguing
that the point of shaming penalties is to minimize degradation of an offender by reducing
pressures for imprisonment and that seeing shaming as a politically feasible alternative to
imprisonment is grounded in a view of public opinion about punishment as complicated
and not simply punitive).
A variant of this debate has concerned itself with the expressive quality of certain law
enforcement practices. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The
New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2477 (1997) (arguing that policies such as
curfews, gang-loitering laws, and shaming penalties are justified on grounds that they may
alleviate crimogenic conditions in crime-ridden communities and thereby alleviate
pressure for more severe punishment). But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows
Theory, and Order Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291 (1998)
(arguing that the empirical claims of "Broken Windows" law enforcement are not
substantiated and criticizing the theoretical foundations of policies as repeatedly relying
on an overly simplistic dichotomy between "honest people and the disorderly").
My argument focuses on a different type of expressiveness in punishment in a number of
important ways. First, the expressive function of punishment in our diverse, secular
society cannot be separated from the negotiation of the moral framework which
punishment purports to express: We use punishment not merely to express but to identify
shared sacred values in our society. See Part I. Second, the process that leads up to the
choice of a sentence is itself expressive in ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated.
See infra Part II. Third, society expresses itself not just through the punishment imposed
but in the way in which it conceives of criminals and crime. See infra Part III. Finally,
each of these expressive dimensions of punishment have combined to create a deeply
embedded way of thinking about sentencing which focuses primarily on the risks of
reoffense. See infra Part IV. I discuss Expressive Punishment more fully in Part V.
44. Roger Cotterrell, The Durkheimian Tradition in the Sociology of Law, 25 L. &
SOC'Y REV. 923, 943 (1991).
45. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT, supra note 19, at 23. This moral framework, which
punishment reinforces, must exist independently of punishment itself. "[P]unishment
cannot by itself produce authority, however harshly it strikes: it can only reinforce a moral
order which is already, authoritatively, there." Id. at 60.
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does not presume the existence of a total consensus on social issues,
however. Durkheim believed that "underneath the surface of
clashing interests and social difference there is in operation a moral
framework which holds competing interests together and provides a
basis for their resolution. '46
B. Punishment and the Secular Sacred in Contemporary American Society
Politicians and other public figures often speak of the nation's
"moral fabric," but what does such an amorphous term really mean in
a society as diverse and as changing as our own? Does some sort of
moral framework exist which binds us all together and provides a
basis for resolving conflicts in values? Much of the law and order
rhetoric surrounding punishment is filled with communicative
metaphors about "sending a message." Such talk is simply incoherent
in the absence of some common moral framework to be
communicated.
A trade off probably exists between how determinate such a
framework would be and how widely it would be shared. With
reference to law, H.L.A. Hart once distinguished between a legal
rule's "core of settled meaning" and the "penumbra of debatable
cases" which experience inevitably throws up.47 To exist in a society
as diverse as our own, a widely shared moral framework would have
to allow for unresolved penumbral cases yet be sufficiently
determinate to mean something in core cases. Definitions of values in
such a framework would have to be capacious, and the interpretive
practices employed would have to be flexible. Such a framework
would constitute a somewhat fuzzy middle ground between the
opposing poles of nihilism and orthodoxy usually triggered by talk of
shared values in a society as diverse as our own.
Some empirical support exists for the proposition that much of
the American middle class thinks in terms of such a flexible moral
framework. Eschewing the use of written surveys and telephone
polls, the sociologist Alan Wolfe conducted a series of in-depth focus
groups with suburban middle class respondents from all regions of the
country. Wolfe found that while his respondents were not
"postmodernist" in their approach to the existence of transcendent
ideas and sacred values, they also were not fundamentalist in their
46. Id. at 51.
47. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
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interpretive approach.48 "It is not that people are skeptical of the old
virtues... instead, they hold such truths to be sacred, but not so
sacred that they should be inflexible.
'49
Furthermore, even if one denied the possibility of a shared moral
framework in a society as diverse as our own, Durkheim's theory of
the process by which modem secular societies try to negotiate such a
framework is still relevant. There may be no "there" there in the
sense of a foundational vision of society upon which most would
agree, but perhaps secular societies continue to seek, to negotiate,
and to construct a shared framework of values which is as meaningful
as possible to as many as possible. Durkheim may have identified
what amounts to an irrepressible urge for a measure of moral
consensus in society, one which some thought we outgrew as our
society became more modern and more secular but which persists in
ways that the rational, secular outlook of much modem social thought
tends to underestimate. 50
Durkheim's use of the concept "sacred" to describe the
energizing values of such a shared moral framework raises a number
of difficulties. First, the idea of the sacred connotes a certain type of
emotional state and both contemporary legal and political theory tend
to neglect emotional states in general.51 Second, sacred is a word with
religious connotations, connotations which by definition seem
incompatible with the secular sensibility of modern societies such as
our own. Indeed, many believe that solidarity in a religiously diverse
society depends upon keeping quasi-religious concepts such as the
sacred outside of the fora where social issues are resolved.52 Third,
the sacred, by definition, speaks to something that is an end in itself.
To this degree, the sacred rubs against the grain of the utilitarian and
instrumental quality of much modem social thought. Much of
political discourse is dominated by discussions of what would result in
the greatest good for society, an orientation which permits the
balancing of competing interests and which facilitates negotiation,
compromise, and conflict resolution in a diverse society. Recognizing
48. ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION AFTER ALL 300 (1998).
49. Id.
50. See id. ("Americans do feel that they have lost the distinction between right and
wrong and desperately want it back," yet "middle-class Americans no longer believe that
right and wrong provide unerring guidelines for informing them about how to lead their
lives.").
51. See generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 2000).
52. See generally STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1994).
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the existence of something called the sacred would seem to be
recognizing the existence of something which would either trump that
greater good or to define that greater good in a way that gave
exclusive priority to a particular perspective.
Yet, some shared concept of the sacred continues to exist in
modem society and punishing crime plays an important role in
expressing it. The sense of awe, of dread, of outrage which most feel
when they read of truly horrible crimes comes from some sense-
however inchoate and inarticulable-of a violation of something
sacred. Consider the following crime, which occurred in a small town
in the rural South last summer. A man becomes angry when he learns
that his wife refuses to become pregnant with his child. He plans to
murder his wife's infant child by a previous marriage. When his wife
is at work, he holds a plastic bag over the eight-month-old girl's head
until the child turns blue and stops breathing. He chooses this
method because he believes that the baby's death will be attributed to
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.53
Such a crime does seem to violate something so important, so
incontestable, so fundamental to how we see ourselves as human
beings that the words "violation of the sacred" seem appropriate.
The mere words "right and wrong" seem inadequate in the face of
such a crime: they seem too abstract, too detached, too philosophical.
What most feel in the face of such a terrible crime is a sense of
terrible awe that anyone could watch an infant suffocate inside of a
plastic bag he was holding over her head. Such a crime produces a
sense of horror in the dictionary definition of the word: "a painful
and intense feeling of fear, dread or dismay. '54 A sense also would
exist that these emotions would be widely shared ones. Most people
reading such a story would feel confident that they could tell this
story to a person of any race, class, or political party and elicit the
same emotions. Different people might attribute the causes of such
behavior differently, but all would feel one in the sense of horror at
the crime itself.55
53. See, e.g., Father Says Revenge Led Him to Kill Son, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER,
June 28, 1999 at A5.
54. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 582 (1988).
55. Some might argue that such a strong example says little about punishment in
general. The routine fare of the criminal justice system is thefts, assaults, and other
transgressions that are far too mundane to elicit such strong reactions. As I will argue in
Part II, however, it is our tendency to think of crime in terms of heinous acts and actors
which has driven criminal justice policy in the last few decades. In this sense, the sacred is
very much a factor in the revolutionary increase in severity that this period has seen.
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Following close upon the sense of awe and horror that such a
crime produces would be a powerful anger-perhaps even a sense of
hatred-that would demand punishment. People would feel that
there would be something deeply wrong with a society that failed to
severely punish a person who did such a thing. It is this sort of thirst
for punishment which Durkheim has in mind when he argues that we
punish violations of the sacred in order to uphold the moral order of a
society.
This desire for punishment would also not be susceptible to
instrumental arguments about the greater social good. Assume for
the sake of argument that it was established beyond any reasonable
doubt that this person would never reoffend and would constitute no
threat to public safety. Assume further that the sorts of people who
commit such crimes are simply not susceptible to deterrence. Most
people would want this man punished, nevertheless. While it is easy
to label such a sentiment retributionist, Durkheim's theory suggests
that the desire to punish is linked strongly to some sense of who we
are as a society. There would simply seem to be something wrong
with us if we did not punish this man to some degree; we would have
trouble living with ourselves as a society. It is at this point that some
public official would probably talk about the symbolism of letting
such a person go free: when people talk about the symbolic in such a
context, they are really talking about what signal a specific
punishment decision gives about the nature of the moral framework
which exists in that society. The audience for this signal is the society
itself, and it is the incontestable nature of the sacred that demands
punishment.56
C. The Role of Crime Stories in Negotiating the Sacred in Our Society
We live in an era of "special story legislation" in matters of
punishment. Vivid stories of individual tragedies have served as
catalysts for sweeping changes in policy a number of times during the
An anthropologist or a philosopher might argue that some culture might exist in
which such a crime would not be considered a violation of the sacred. This would not
establish that no concept of the sacred existed in such a society; it would prove only that
the anthropologist or philosopher had imagined or discovered a society fundamentally
different from our own in very important ways.
56. Some might feel that dwelling at length upon such a horrible crime in this context
is either gratuitously shocking or improperly manipulative of the reader's emotions. Part
of my argument, however, is that our thinking about punishment has failed to properly
appreciate the role which emotions play in our practices of punishment. Writing about
punitive emotions in a detached way simply fails to communicate this point because
emotions themselves are best appreciated experientially and not just intellectually.
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eighties and nineties. In 1986, the death by cocaine overdose of a
black college basketball player who had been the first round draft
pick of the Boston Celtics precipitated efforts by then-Speaker of the
House Tip O'Neill (a Boston native) to impose strict mandatory
sentences for possessing or selling crack cocaine, legislation that
would ultimately result in a dramatic increase in federal prison
populations. In California, the passage of the Three Strikes initiative
owes much, if not all, to the horrifying murder of Polly Klaas. Klaas
was a twelve-year-old girl who was abducted from her own living
room during a slumber party while her mother was sleeping in an
adjoining room. Her death at the hands of a recidivist offender, who
had been released on parole, galvanized support for a Three Strikes
measure whose provisions included mandatory life sentences for any
felony conviction by an offender who already had two serious (but
not necessarily violent) felonies. In New Jersey, the sexual murder of
eight-year-old Megan Kanka by a recently released sex offender
resulted in the passage of "Megan's law," which requires public
notifications anytime a person convicted of a sex offense is released
back into a community, a measure which was subsequently adopted in
a number of jurisdictions.57 Perhaps the most politically influential
story of the period, however, regarded crimes committed by an
inmate named Willie Horton while on a prison furlough. That crime
story may have influenced the outcome of the 1988 presidential
election and established the power of a simple theme in criminal
justice policy: any politician, judge, or prosecutor who authorizes the
release of a potentially violent offender will be held politically
accountable for any future crimes committed by him.58
Stories of crime and punishment are deeply intertwined with a
secular society's search for a collective sense of the sacred because the
most powerful stories about the sacred tend to be stories about the
violation of the sacred. In part, these may be an extension of the well
known psychological aversion of the human mind to loss: people
respond more powerfully to stories of prospective loss than to
prospective gain.59 In a similar vein, society finds a more powerful
experience of its sacred attitudes toward children, for example, in
57. See Phillip Jenkins, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 197-207 (1998).
58. For a fuller discussion of the Horton controversy and of this particular dynamic,
see infra Part IV.
59. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM.,
Jan. 1982, at 160 ("[T]he threat of a loss has a greater impact on a decision than the
possibility of an equivalent gain.").
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stories of death or injury to children than in stories about the health
and welfare of children. The special power of stories of terrible
crimes entails more than simply the loss of the sacred, however, as
some element of deliberate human action plays an important role. A
busload of children killed by a freak avalanche on a mountain road
involves a sacred loss, but absent some sort of negligence on
someone's part that loss has a tragic quality which does not energize
people in the same way that a crime does. If some element of human
agency can be identified as the cause of a sacred loss, people's sadness
turns into a more powerful outrage. A story about a busload of
children killed because of a driver who failed to drive carefully
mobilizes sentiment more than a freak accident because the element
of human agency involved implicates society directly, and upholding
the moral order requires condemning that negligence in some way. A
drunk bus driver mobilizes more social energy because the deliberate
nature of the act of drinking and driving injects an element of
wrongfulness into the equation which challenges the society even
more directly. A murderous bus driver, one who comes to work one
day with an automatic weapon to shoot his charges, unleashes the
most powerful social energies because his actions are a truly
deliberate violation of the welfare of children. Here, society has not
only a "body to kick" (a human agent responsible for the loss) but "a
soul to damn" (a person who has deliberately done something so
reprehensible as to be beyond the understanding of almost all of
society's members).
The deliberate violation of the sacred provides a society with the
most powerful and the most unambiguous moments of collective
passion about those things that that society cherishes most deeply.
Horrible crimes provide moments of communion for a secular society
that no longer comes together within the walls of any one church or
around any one text. In these moments of communion, society finds
respite from anxieties about the things that divide it. Such respites in
turn may build confidence that what binds the society together-a
deeply felt and widely shared understanding of "the important things
in life" -is stronger than the forces that threaten to pull it apart.
Indeed, the absence of a common philosophical approach to
moral questions and the lack of a shared vocabulary for the
expression of transcendent principles may make modem secular
societies more dependent on the stories of violation of the sacred
which crime provides. How do the diverse members of large and
changing modem societies talk to one another about the important
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issues of social life in an environment where abstract principles are
subject to misinterpretation for linguistic and cultural reasons and
where the power of the abstract to command allegiance is accordingly
diminished? We communicate most easily in such environments
through stories about the violation of the sacred: narratives which
create in the listeners a common emotional experience, an experience
which more homogeneous societies might be able to create through
the mere incantation of some abstract principle or dogma from a
shared sacred text.
A moral framework developed principally through stories about
violation of the sacred would inevitably have a patch quilt quality, not
the finely woven feel of a coherent set of philosophical principles.
This piecemeal quality simply reflects in part the limits of language
where the interpretive approaches of the various audiences of a social
text are not always compatible. In part, this piecemeal quality also
might reflect the limited scope of agreement possible in a diverse
society regardless of barriers to communication. Stories can serve as
cultural resources for discovering the maximal amount of solidarity
possible between groups with very different perspectives. Stories may
permit you to patch together more of a common moral fabric in a
diverse society than the more rigorous methods of philosophical
analysis could weave. 6° In this sense, diverse secular societies may be
even more likely to rely on punishment to experience and negotiate
their shared sense of the sacred than more homogenous societies with
more uniform religious beliefs.
H. Race and the Durkheimian Double Blind
Since the beginning of the nation, white Americans have suffered
from a deep inner uncertainty as to who they really are. One of the
ways that has been used to simplify the answer has been to seize
upon the presence of black Americans and use them as a marker, a
symbol of limits, a metaphor for the "outsider."
-Ralph Ellison61
Race has made it difficult for punishment in our society to be
truly morally expressive in the way that Durkheim envisioned. Most
jurisdictions have moved toward a more determinate process of
sentencing, partially as a response to controversies about the role of
60. See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic
Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & Soc'Y REv. 197 (1995).
61. Ralph Ellison, What America Would Be Like Without Blacks (1970), quoted in
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 1 (1993).
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race in punishment. These more determinate sentencing processes
ultimately mute the expressive force of punishment, however,
because they minimize the degree to which individualized
assessments of the moral culpability of the offender can be used in
deciding upon a sentence. The result is what I call the Durkheimian
Double Bind: more objective punishment processes that seek to
minimize social division also minimize punishment's ability to be truly
expressive of society's moral values. One way to evade this tension is
to focus on monstrous conceptions of crime and criminals: the
monstrous criminal elicits maximal condemnation at minimal cost to
social solidarity. To the degree that punishment practices designed
with monstrous criminals in mind are applied to lesser offenders,
however, the sense of solidarity created is false and one which
ultimately exacerbates racial divisions.
A. Race, Social Control, and The Neglect of Durkheim in America
Race makes Durkheim hard to swallow in America. Imagine
that the entire population of the state of Delaware was black: we
have the equivalent of a black state of Delaware incarcerated on any
given day.62
While African-Americans constitute only 12% of the general
population, they constitute half of the prison population: one out of
every fourteen adult black males is incarcerated on any given day.
When probation and parole are included, one out of every three black
males in the 20-29 age group is under some form of criminal justice
supervision.63
Durkheim's punishment theory has been generally eclipsed by
theories of punishment as social control by elites. Criminal justice has
often been used in this society as an instrument of racial
subordination and of control of other "dangerous classes" such as
immigrant groups and the urban poor.64  To the degree the
connection between American punishment and social solidarity is
discussed, it is usually not the happy tale of affirming widely held
sacred values which Durkheim tells but a dark and dysfunctional
62. See World Almanac, supra note 10, at 381 (citing the Bureau of Census population
figure for Delaware in 1997 as 731,581); MAUER, supra note 3, at 124 (stating that half of
our 1.5 million people in prison are African-American).
63. See MAUER, supra note 3, at 124-25.
64. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
83-106 (1993); DIANA R. GORDON, THE RETURN OF THE DANGEROUS CLASSES: DRUG
PROHIBITION AND POLICY POLITICS (1994); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND
THE LAW 76-136 (1997).
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story about social segregation and control: mainstream America
defining itself in opposition to the criminal "other" through
punishment. Outsider groups are persecuted in order to reinforce
their distinctness and to maintain the dominant social, economic, and
political position of the in-group.65
This standard account undoubtedly explains some of the support
for the recent severity revolution in American punishment, but as I
will argue in Part III, it does not explain everything. Some portion of
those who support severity undoubtedly do so out of pure racism or
out of more inchoate desires to maintain their social and political
position. But the salient point for the purposes of my argument is
that a neglected portion of the political support for increased severity
may come from those who rely upon punishment to make symbolic
statements about their society's moral order. This segment of the
polity does not need punishment to be either racist or draconian, but
they do want it to be expressive for the reasons that Durkheim
explained in terms of a felt need for social cohesion.
Ultimately, all accounts of punishment are partial accounts. No
one theory explains the whole enterprise. My claim for Durkheim's
theory is that it constitutes a partial explanation for severity, which
has been neglected, and a particularly useful explanation at that.
Racists and those who simply fear "the dangerous classes" will
probably always support severity. The utility of Durkheim's partial
account is that it may generate insights about that segment of the
public whose support for severity may be contingent in ways that have
not been sufficiently appreciated.
B. The Turn Toward More Determinate Sentencing Processes
What does Durkheim have to tell us about race and punishment?
Durkheim provides us with a different lens for looking at the problem
of race. Rather than viewing race and punishment exclusively as
matters of social control, Durkheim focuses our attention on the ways
in which controversies about race complicate punishment's ability to
foster social cohesion. Race raises questions in American society
about the meaning of the moral framework which punishment is
supposed to help forge and express. These questions run so deep that
they make contextual decisions about sentencing inherently
65. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY 11, 28-43 (1997) ("The
rhetoric of law and order was first mobilized in the late 1950s as southern governors and
law enforcement officials attempted to generate and mobilize white opposition to the civil
rights movement.").
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contestable. Ultimately, the Durkheimian perspective helps us to see
determinate sentencing not just as an attempt to minimize racial
disparity or as an attempt to entrench it but also as a (failed) attempt
to minimize controversies about racial disparities in criminal justice.
A majority of jurisdictions in this country have moved to a more
determinate sentencing process. This has been accomplished through
a variety of measures which all either constrained or eliminated the
judge's discretion at sentencing. Mandatory minimum penalties
prevent a judge from imposing a sentence below a statutory
minimum; structured sentencing pursuant to guidelines developed by
the legislature or a sentencing commission typically creates a
sentencing grid by using the dual axis of seriousness of offense and
prior criminal record. Presumptive sentencing schemes such as
California's involve legislatively set sentencing ranges for each
offense with specified aggravating and mitigating factors identified.
Between mandatory minimums and various structured sentencing
arrangements, many states have made their sentencing more
determinate over the last two decades. Sentencing in the federal
system is heavily constrained by both mandatory minimum penalties
and by the 273 box grid of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
Guidelines. As of 1996, sentencing commissions existed in nineteen
states.66 The use of mandatory minimums is also widespread. All
fifty states and the District of Columbia employ some form of
mandatory minimum sentence: forty states have mandatory
minimums for repeat or habitual offenders, and twenty-four of these
states do so in the form of a Three Strikes measure; thirty-eight states
impose mandatory minimums for crimes involving use of a deadly
weapon; thirty-six have mandatory minimums for drug possession or
trafficking; and thirty states impose mandatory minimums for certain
sex offenses. 67
66. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 1996 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE
SENTENCING STRUCTURES 11-12 (1998).
67. See id. at I n.1, 4-8, 16. For an overview of current research, policy developments,
and practical experiences with these more determinate forms of sentencing see TONRY,
SENTENCING, supra note 12. Ron Wright has pointed out to me that the stated rationale
for the movement toward more determinate sentencing shifted from initial concerns about
disparity and fairness in the eighties to subsequent concerns about overcrowding, taxpayer
expense and "truth-in sentencing" in the nineties. See also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh,
The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (describing the subtle transformation of
federal sentencing reform from an anti-imprisonment and anti-discrimination measure to a
law and order crime control measure). While I acknowledge that this standard account
has much truth to it, I offer my account about contestability as a necessary supplement to
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Given the absence of incontestable external criteria for
punishment decisions, it is perhaps not surprising that systems of
sentencing have been constructed around the two internal criteria
with the strongest claim to objectivity: the defendant's prior criminal
record and the charge for the instant offense. These factors provide
the axis for almost all structured sentencing grids, the key variables
for all legislative determinant systems, and the main ingredients of the
patch quilt of mandatory minimums which many jurisdictions have
laid over their sentencing systems. Ultimately, these more
determinate sentencing processes can be understood as attempts to
reduce the contestability of sentencing decisions.
There is a revealing irony in this trend in our sentencing
processes at the same time that special crime stories have greatly
influenced criminal justice legislation. The move toward more
determinate sentencing schemes in a majority of jurisdictions has
created a decision making process that is less contextual and more
mechanical. While legislation is increasingly being crafted and passed
with compelling narratives about individual cases in mind, the actual
sentencing of offenders in individual cases is increasingly determined
by the application of a sentencing formula. These formulas are based
on determinations made about criminal conduct in the aggregate. In
this sense, criminal justice decision making has become contextual
and story-driven on the macro level but abstract and almost
mathematical on the micro level.
C. Determinate Sentencing as a Response to Racial Disparity
Ironically, this upside-down quality of contemporary criminal
justice decision making is in part a product of anxieties about social
solidarity. The move toward more determinate sentencing schemes in
the seventies and eighties was in part a response to the enormous
racial disparities of the criminal justice system under the more
indeterminate sentencing practices of the sixties and seventies. In the
standard account, liberals supported more determinate sentencing as
a means of reducing invidious racial discrimination in the criminal
justice system. It was not generally thought that more determinate
sentencing would be less severe, just less unequal. Conservatives
supported the move toward more determinate sentencing as a means
of moving from rehabilitation to strict accountability in punishment.
More determinate sentencing would reduce opportunities for judges
that account. Indeed, contestability may help explain how a bipartisan coalition of support
for more determinate sentencing survived a shift in fundamental motivations.
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to mitigate sentences for socioeconomically deprived offenders.
Ultimately, the compromise struck by more determinate sentencing
processes was that judges would be less able to discriminate against or
for a defendant on account of their race.
While some might argue that more determinate sentencing has
reduced invidious racial discrimination in judicial sentencing, it is
simply a fact that radical racial disparities remain. Critics of the status
quo have offered a number of explanations for the continued
disparities: discrimination in the discretionary law enforcement,
including charging and plea bargaining decisions which precede
and-to a greater degree than before- determine judicial sentencing;
disproportionately severe sentences for crimes that are committed
predominantly by people of color such as the infamous "500:1"
disparity between federal penalties for crack and cocaine in its
powder form; inequalities in the access of the poor to quality legal
defense. Defenders of the status quo opine that racial disparities in
incarceration reflect racial disparities in crime (despite social science
evidence to the contrary).
In light of the continued racial disparities in criminal justice, a
variety of theories are possible about the move toward greater
disparity. Some believe that it was a good faith effort at reducing
racial disparity that failed. Some believe that it was a bad faith effort
to entrench racial disparities (and the social control which these
disparities entailed): a formal, acontextual and highly analytical
judicial sentencing process confers a patina of objectivity over a
system where racial discrimination is embedded in legislative
practices and is ubiquitous in the discretionary decision processes of
police and prosecutors. To the degree that the move toward
determinate sentencing was the result of a broad political consensus,
there is undoubtedly some truth in both accounts. Durkheim's ideas
about the primacy of social cohesion in punishment practices suggests
a third account of the initial and continued popularity of more
determinate sentencing processes, however, one which focuses not on
the results of sentencing systems but on their apparent legitimacy.
This third account views more determinate sentencing processes as a
means of reducing the contestability of judicial sentencing.
D. The Inherent Contestability of Contextual Sentencing
Determining whether someone is discriminating on racial
grounds when they do not accept an application for employment,
higher education, or housing from a person of color is difficult.
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Determining if a judge is discriminating on racial grounds when she
decides what sentence a defendant of color "deserves," or whether
the defendant is a danger to society, or whether the defendant should
be afforded an opportunity to rehabilitate is infinitely more difficult.
At least in the contexts of housing, employment, and higher
education, an external market of sorts exists which provides some
baseline for comparison. While that baseline is often attacked as a
social construction which itself embodies racist assumptions and
practices, it at least provides a starting place for analysis. An African-
American denied housing on economic criteria, for example, could
provide wage statements, bank balances, and debt histories which
might constitute some objective evidence of discrimination. In
contrast, criminal sentencing is a social construction without an
external market: the only thing it can compare itself to is itself. An
African-American defendant denied probation and sent to prison on
a first offense could compare himself to a white defendant given
probation for the same first offense, but comparing sentencing
decisions is inherently difficult. Victims do not provide offenders
with a receipt specifying the seriousness of the harm inflicted against
them. No "Internal Rehabilitation Service" exists to provide each
citizen with a statement indicating his or her potential for
rehabilitation for any given year of their life. Did the judge have a
legitimate basis for concluding that the white offender either
committed a less heinous crime or was more likely to rehabilitate?
The absence of objective, external measures for use in comparing
criminal sentences makes it difficult to assess whether race is playing
an improper role in any given case.68
The difficulty of dealing with race sentencing has also grown as a
result of the continued economic decline of many of America's inner
cities.69 To the degree that employment can serve as one objective
indicator of rehabilitative potential, the disappearance of work in the
inner city during the seventies and eighties made the sentencing
decision in communities of color even more difficult. Jonathan Simon
provided evidence of this dynamic in his account of parole practices in
California. 70  Simon explored the connection between the
68. To be sure, the criminal justice system generates internal criteria that could be
used to evaluate claims of discrimination. Criminal records are compiled, but the race
neutrality of the convictions underlying those records are themselves at issue.
69. With respect to the economic decline of the inner cities see WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997).
70. See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL
OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 205-67 (1993).
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disappearance of jobs for inner city residents and the reorientation of
parole in California from a rehabilitative orientation to one of risk
management. In his account, a parolee's ability to secure and hold
employment was seen as evidence that he was rehabilitating.
Employment status was an easy external indicia of normalization
which the parole agent could verify. With the disappearance of low-
skilled industrial jobs in the inner cities, however, parole agents were
forced to rely on more therapeutic-based assessments of the parolee's
adjustment back into society. With the further decline of the labor
market in the seventies and the accompanying destabilization of inner
city communities, parole abandoned the rehabilitative enterprise
altogether and embraced internally generated criteria such as drug
testing, rate of failures to report to the supervising agent, and arrests
for subsequent offenses. They simply sought to manage and monitor
the parolee.
I call this problem contestability. The role of race in criminal
sentencing is inherently contestable in the sense that it is difficult to
either prove or disprove whether racial discrimination is taking place
in any given case, contestable because there is no objective baseline
for comparing cases of disparate treatment. A contextual sentencing
process is thereby a contestable sentencing process, and contestability
continues to matter because racial disparities continue to plague the
criminal justice system. A contestable sentencing process is a site for
continued and insoluble controversies about racial justice, and these
controversies exacerbate anxieties about the solidarity of our society.
Solidarity-related concerns about contestability have helped push
sentencing in our society in a more determinate and less contextual
direction, and this constitutes one half of the Durkheimian Double-
Bind.
E. The Inevitable Tension Between Morally Expressive Punishment and
Determinate Sentencing
In a very important sense, our severity revolution is
schizophrenic in nature: "getting tough on crime" has come to mean
both expressing society's values and trying to protect the public at all
costs. These two themes of punishment have been wrapped together
in the "law and order" policies of the last two decades.
The first point to make about these 'tough on crime' measures is
that however much they engage in an expressive mode of action-
punishing for its own sake, conveying public sentiment,
emphasizing punitive or denunciatory objectives-they
simultaneously evince a more instrumental logic. Typically each
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measure operates upon two different registers-an expressive,
punitive scale that uses the symbols of condemnation and suffering
to communicate its message; and an instrumental register, attuned
to objectives of public protection and risk management. The
favored modes of punitive expression are also, and importantly,
modes of penal segregation and penal marking. The policy concern
today is neither purely punitive nor solely oriented towards public
protection. The new penal ideal is that the public be protected and
its sentiments be expressed. Punitive segregation-lengthy sentence
terms in no frills prisons, and a marked, monitored existence for
those who are eventually released-is increasingly the penal
strategy of choice.71
So familiar are these dual themes that no conflict between expressive
punishment and instrumental punishment seems to exist in public
discourse about punishment. The longer, more frequent, and more
automatic prison sentences of the severity revolution both express our
moral outrage at crime and better protect the public by incapacitating
offenders. What is the problem?
The problem is that a society's choice of sentencing scheme must
inevitably balance the moral dimension of punishment against moral
instrumental concerns such as public safety: this tension constitutes
the second half of the Double-Bind I have been describing. The more
determinate sentencing schemes which are at the core of the severity
revolution are exercises in what Albert Alshuler has called a "harm-
based system of penology."72 The nature and length of the sentence is
based primarily on the harm to society deemed to result from the
offense committed. A robbery carries a certain range of sentences
because of the harm the legislature or the sentencing commission
deems to flow from the occurrence of robberies in society; assaults
carry a different range of sentences based on the harm to society of
assaults and so on. The other principal factor is the defendant's past
criminal record, and the influence of prior convictions in the
sentencing calculus is also a function of the seriousness of the harm to
society of those past offenses.
More determinate sentencing and the harm-based penology upon
which it is based inevitably leave less room for an individualized
assessment of an offender's circumstances. A defendant who has
committed a crime despite every advantage in life is often given the
71. Garland, Culture, supra note 5, at 350.
72. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 908-09 (1991) (arguing that "offenders who have
produced comparable harms differ greatly in culpability").
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exact same sentence as a defendant who has received no
opportunities to develop his potentiality for good. This is what the
philosopher John Kekes has called the hard reaction to evil. The hard
reaction to evil defines a person's character solely in terms of actions:
if you do bad things you are bad. It is a fundamentally utilitarian
approach to justice because it defines morality solely in terms of what
might minimize harm.73 Kekes contrasts this approach (which he
defends) to what he terms the soft reaction to evil.
The more intimately we know others, the more familiar we are with
their motivation, circumstances, the information they have, and the
constraints under which they operate, the less likely it is that we
would be willing to allow their evil actions to reflect on their
characters. Intimate understanding of human conduct tends to
reveal complexities disguised from superficial acquaintances.
These complexities, then, function as excuses, preventing us from
judging the agents of evil actions as harshly as would be entailed by
calling them, and not only their actions, evil.74
The soft reaction to evil attempts to weigh both a person's past
opportunities to choose good and their future potentiality to become
good: this requires an individualized consideration of the past
circumstances of each offender. Ultimately, it approaches justice in
terms of a more transcendent sense of morality, one which attempts
to measure the moral worth of the offender and not merely to
measure the harm that the offender has caused.
Ultimately, the more determinate the sentencing scheme-the
harder the system's reaction to evil-the less opportunity that exists
for punishment practices to express the sort of transcendent moral
principles which Durkheim saw as central to functional punishment in
modern, secular societies. In this sense, there is an inherent tension
between punishment as pure "crime control" or "risk management"
and punishment as an attempt to express and reinforce a society's
moral framework in meaningful ways. Ultimately, contemporary
penalty is an attempt to force punishment to serve two incompatible
masters.75
73. See JOHN KEKES, FACING EVIL 6 (1990).
74. Id. at 5-6.
75. Garland sees a "deep connection between the development of an administrative
form of penal sanctioning-premised upon behavior control rather than moral appeal-
and the decline of moral community in modem society." GARLAND, PUNISHMENT, supra
note 19, at 76.
Unlike Puritan punishments, for example, where penal measures were conceived
as an aspect of community life and which aimed for the moral reintegration of
the offender, modem penalty is seen as a management problem, aimed at the
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F. The False Solidarity Created by the Monstrous Offender
There is one way to allow punishment to be both instrumental
and expressive of a more transcendent morality at the same time:
offenders must be conceived of in as absolutely evil terms as possible.
The monstrous offender eliminates the tension between a penology
based on minimizing risks of harm to society and expressive
punishment: monstrous conceptions of crime make the hard reaction
to evil embodied in more determinate sentencing processes less
controversial. The crimes of the monstrous offender demand harsh
punishment, and the failure of the sentencing scheme to consider the
past circumstances and future potential of the offender diminishes in
importance. Monsters are monsters, whatever the origins of their
birth, and the felt need to incapacitate the monstrous offender on the
pragmatic grounds of self-protection would bring together those who
might disagree on the moral culpability of an offender whose crimes
had their origin in life conditions which were the product of racial and
socioeconomic inequalities.
Punishment of crime conceived in monstrous terms could also
forge social solidarity between those who disagree about whether
punishment should be about moral culpability at all. The harsher
punishments which would logically flow from such conceptions would
seem to carry greater expressive force, and this would seem
comforting to those who seek to affirm society's moral framework
through punishment. Those who have lost faith altogether in
punishment's expressive moral force-or in the very existence of a
moral framework which is actually shared by those subject to the
practices of punishment-would be satisfied with the maximal
amounts of incapacitation and deterrence achieved by the harsher
sentence. Monstrous offenders resolve the schizophrenic tensions of
contemporary penality by allowing society to foster solidarity by
being maximally morally expressive while hedging its bet with the
greatest degree of self-protection. Problem solved?
To the degree that the monstrous conceptions of crime upon
which such a system would be premised are myths, however, the
actual effects of such practices on social solidarity would be
disastrous, especially in a society such as our own where punishment
practices fall disproportionately on communities of color and the
poor.76 Sentences whose severity was based on conceptions of crime
containment of deviant groups who are, in all likelihood beyond real integration.
I&
76. See generally TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 12.
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more serious than what actually exists and whose imposition ignored
the differing potentialities of each offender for good and bad would
not be interpreted as being expressive of a shared moral framework
by the people and communities most subject to penal practices. In
communities of color, a more plausible interpretation would be
simple racism. For example, drug laws which impose draconian
prison terms on "drug dealers" would appear to be necessary
expressions of a widely shared morality to a white middle class which
conceives of drug dealers in the abstract as violent and uncaring
sociopaths who prey on the young and the vulnerable. People who
live in the communities where such draconian drug laws are enforced
would see a different reality, however. The "drug dealers" they
would see arrested most frequently would be "runners" who were
often addicts themselves and had no history of violence. Watching
such offenders sentenced to long prison sentences under mandatory
drug laws would probably seem immoral, irrational, and racist. To
the degree that the white majority of society believed in their
monstrous constructions, however, the hostility of communities of
color to the prosecution and enforcement of the criminal laws would
seem inexplicable. (Occasionally, a murder case might even come
along involving a famous black defendant and white victims which
might reveal just how differently the two groups saw the criminal
justice system in their society). The sense of racial division furthered
by such punishment might fuel further anxieties about the degree to
which all members of our diverse society truly share some common
moral ground, anxieties which might lead to even more severe
punishment practices in a continuous upward spiral of severity which
would baffle experts and occasion numerous law review articles.
77
In the remainder of this Article, I will try to demonstrate that this
is exactly what is happening in contemporary punishment. We
conceive of crime in monstrous terms and we sentence accordingly, in
order to exorcise our anxieties about solidarity and to justify a risk
management approach to justice. These monstrous conceptions have
disfigured our shared vision of moral order. In the severity
revolution, we are reaping what our anxious imaginations have sown.
77. Indeed, experts are somewhat baffled and disheartened about the degree to which
public opinion and policy seems impervious to empirical arguments about crime and
sentencing policies. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, "Why Are We Ignored?" The Peculiar
Place of Experts in the Current Debate about Crime and Justice, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 305
(1995); Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and The Decline of
Expert Authority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in California, 28 PAc. L.J. 243
(1996).
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HI. Scapegoating and Social Constructionism
BEWARE!
There is a new GANG INITIATION!!
This new initiation of murder is brought about by Gang Members
driving around at night with their car lights off. When you flash
your car lights to signal them that their lights are out, the Gang
Members take it literally as "Lights Out," so they follow you to
your destination and kill you! That's their initiation.
Two families have already fallen victim to this initiation ritual. Be
aware and inform your families and friends.
DO NOT FLASH YOUR CAR LIGHTS FOR ANYONE!!
-flyer circulated in Chicago, 1993 78
The warning contained in the above quoted flyer was circulated
nationally during the fall of 1993: law enforcement sent out alerts; the
press issued warnings; the message went out through countless faxes
and phone calls.79 The crimes described in the warnings never
happened, however. No killing was ever linked to a "lights out"
initiation.80 Why were so many people so willing to believe such a
story about such a meaningless, terrible crime? "It could happen,
people told themselves. That's just the kind of thing gangs do. 81
People had constructed an image of gang members as remorseless
predators who would readily kill a family for a whimsical reason, and
they had constructed an image of the gang problem as widespread.
Such a warning fits effortlessly into such constructions, and in the
process apocryphal tales such as these reinforce those constructions.
This tendency to think in terms of the worst has operated
powerfully during recent "moral panics" about sexual abuse of
children, violent juvenile crime, crack cocaine use, and various forms
of random violence. Social constructionists have studied many such
panics about crime.82 While some of the panics were built around
events such as the "lights out" story which are purely fictional,83 most
exaggerated relatively rare crimes as being widespread, often
78. JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE 1 (1999) (quoting circulated flyer).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 5.
81. Id. at 2.
82. See, e.g., IMAGES OF ISSUES (Joel Best ed., 1995).
83. For example, the previous year's gang initiation story had described "ankle
grabbings" where gang members would wait under parked cars, grab the ankles of the
driver when they approached, and then slash the Achilles tendon of the vicitim before
robbing, raping, or killing them. See id. at 2.
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distorting the nature of the crime in the process. The common theme
which runs through many of these accounts is scapegoating: society
has used monstrous conceptions of crime and criminals as scapegoats
to divert attention and anxiety away from social problems which
threaten to further divide society. In this Part, I will offer a
constructionist "meta-account" of the overall increase in the severity
of punishment as a whole: inchoate anxieties about the cohesiveness
of our society have driven the movement toward more draconian
punishment. I will then illustrate that account with an analysis of
several of the more notable moral panics of recent years.84
A. The Severity Revolution as an Exercise in Deep Scapegoating
Durkheim would probably interpret the severity of our
contemporary punishment practices as a direct result of the
widespread and profound anxieties that we harbor about our
solidarity as a society.85 Durkheim recognized that the relationship
between social solidarity and punishment could exist in both
functional and dysfunctional forms. In a stable society, punishment
may help maintain that stability by reinforcing the society's moral
framework. An unstable society, however, may express its
insecurities through practices of punishment that are overly harsh.
Punishment is used most frequently where authority is weakest-
but in such cases it has least effect. Alternatively, a strong and
legitimately established moral order requires only token sanctions
to restore itself and deal with violators .... [T]he more
authoritative, stable and legitimate the political-moral order, the
less need there is for terroristic or force displaying uses of
punishment. 86
The incarceration boom of the last two decades can be interpreted in
this light as the desperate attempts of an insecure society to reassure
itself of the strength of the moral framework which binds its disparate
elements together.87 Punishing harder becomes the anthropomorphic
84. For a general review of the literature on the public's fear of crime, see C. Hale,
Fear of Crime: A Review of the Literature, 4 INT'L REV. VICIMOLOGY 79 (1996).
85. See generally MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMATORIES, AND CHAIN
GANGS (1997) (arguing from a Durkheimian perspective that historically punishment has
increased in the United States during times of perceived social disintegration).
86. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT, supra note 19, at 61.
87. Some argue, of course, that contemporary severity in punishment is simply the
expression of a harsher and more rigid set of public attitudes towards punishment. My
argument is that many have mistaken anxiety about change with a desire for draconian
punishment. The literature exploring contemporary attitudes about punishment provides
no clear support for a claim that people have simply become more punitive. See
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equivalent of raising your voice in order to be heard.88 Punishing
harder to reassure ourselves of the continued vibrancy of a shared
moral framework is an exercise in scapegoating to the degree that
those punished are not responsible for what is threatening the moral
order-or that their punishment is disproportionate to the threat to
that order which their criminal behavior constitutes.
A scapegoat is generally understood to be "one that is made to
bear the blame of others."8 9 The severity revolution is an exercise in
what I call deep scapegoating. Deep scapegoating is the identification
of some person, group, or thing upon which one projects things that
no one person or group or thing is to blame for. Deep scapegoating
involves assigning blame for fears and frustrations that are inchoate
and that have no readily identifiable or attackable cause. In studying
scapegoating in American culture, Andrew Delbanco found a perfect
example of this sort of thinking in Herman Melville's Moby Dick:
Gottfredson et al, Conflict and Consensus about Criminal Justice in Maryland, in PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TO SENTENCING 16, 50 (Walker & Hough eds., 1988) (finding "pluralistic
ignorance" where both public officials and one public "assign high priorities to the goal of
rehabilitation or treatment and agree that simple retributive punishment is the least
desirable goal for a correctional system" but public officials believe that "the general
public strongly support the goal of retributive punishment and would offer only very weak
support to the goal of rehabilitation."); see also Francis Cullen et al., Explaining the Get-
Tough Movement: Can the Public Be Blamed?, 45 FED. PROBATION 2, 16-54 (1985); JOHN
DOBLE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE PUBLIC'S VIEW (1987); Timothy Flanagan,
Change and Influence in Popular Criminology: Public Attributions of Crime Causation, 15
J. CRIM. JUST. 231 (1987); Julian Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal Justice, in
16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH. But see Joseph Jacoby &
Francis Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245
(1999) (arguing that the public prefers linking prison only to the harm of the offense and
not the offender's characteristics although acknowledging that focus groups reveal a
greater malleability of opinion). See also supra sources cited notes 21-22. In light of the
ambiguity of empirical work studying punitive public sentiments, this Part argues that the
public's tendency to conceive crime in monstrous terms is linked to an increase in felt
anxieties about social solidarity (regardless of whether an increase in those anxieties is
actually justified). I offer this account as a plausible (and hopefully persuasive)
explanation of a social phenomenon which has resisted direct, empirical analysis.
88. This interpretation recasts the statistics comparing incarceration rates between the
United States and other countries in an interesting light. The United States is perhaps the
most culturally and socioeconomically diverse western society. Is it a coincidence that the
United States is also the most punitive? The United States currently incarcerates at the
rate of approximately 600 inmates per 100,000 members of its population, a figure which
translates into incarcerating 1 out of every 155 citizens (and that is including newborn
babies and senior citizens in the calculation of the total population). The closest Western
European country is Spain which incarcerates 105 inmates for every 100,000 citizens. See
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
USE OF INCARCERATION, 1995 (1997).
89. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1611 (3d ed.
1992).
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Captain Ahab's implacable hatred of the whale which he hunts to the
point of Ahab's own extinction.
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of
things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and
cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all
evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically
assailable in Moby-Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump
the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from
Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst
his hot heart's shell upon it.90
For Delbanco, the power of this passage flows from its insight into an
unattractive but enduring trait of human nature: the desire to make
meaning out of suffering in the simplest way possible. Many of life's
frustrations can not be traced to any definite source. To be able to
locate "all that maddens and torments" in a form that is "assailable"
has obvious appeal.
For Delbanco, Ahab prefigures the demagogues of the coming
twentieth century in his ability to enlist his crew in his vision of an
external, attackable source of all evil in the world. "The demagogue
replaces the sense of life as a series of random defeats with the
possibility of righteous struggle against a huntable enemy."91 The
Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan, the McCarthyites of the fifties, all drew their
strength, in Delbanco's view, from an "ability to sweep away people's
fear that their sufferings were meaningless, and to convince them
instead that there exists a gloating consciousness that has arrayed the
world against them."92
How does Ahab draw the entire crew of his ship, the Pequod,
into his vision of whale-as-evil-incarnate? The simple answer is that
Ahab builds solidarity around a sympathetic identification with a
victim-in this case, himself.
He does it by compelling them to feel his suffering as their own.
He touches their private heart-wounds. He makes them feel how
'Ahab and anguish [had lain] stretched together in one hammock,'
how 'his torn body and gashed soul [had] bled into one another,'
and in so doing he makes them feel that he is at one with them-
victims all, wounded discards, sufferers almost beyond
90. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 200 (Penguin Books 1992) (1851), quoted in
ANDREW DELBANCO, THE DEATH OF SATAN: How AMERICANS HAVE LOST THE
SENSE OF EVIL 181 (1995).
91. Id.
92- Id.
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recompense. 93
Ahab's use of victim-hood to concentrate group emotion has obvious
analogies to contemporary crime discourse where the victim of crime
has come to serve as a "representative figure"94 whose sufferings have
been accorded sacred status in debates about crime policy.95 But this
answer only takes us so far. What is the source of the power of the
victim as a symbol? Why was Ahab able to draw his crew so
completely into his own suffering?
Ahab's appeal can be best understood in terms of a longing for
cohesion by his crew, a longing of cohesion which has obvious
analogies to our somewhat alienated and divided modern society.
Ahab offered his men an experience of communion that they deeply
desired but would have had trouble articulating. A band of
essentially isolated figures, each cut off from kith and kin, they
worked and lived in close proximity subject to a discipline that was
based on the most impersonal and instrumental ties. They faced
danger and death as part of their life at sea, and, perhaps, the greatest
part of that challenge was that they faced the danger of a typically
modem death in terms of its meaninglessness. The crewman who lost
his life or his limb on board knew in his last moments that his loss
served nothing greater than a commercial enterprise, and his own loss
now greatly exceeded his share of the gain.
Ahab offered them something more. He offered them a vision of
their lives as bound together by something more than the harsh
discipline of maritime law or a sterile concert of commercial interests.
He offered them the prospect of a meaningful death, a death lost in
the expiation of their own suffering and of all the suffering of all of
their shipmates. He offered them a vision of their life on board as
bound together by love, a love born of the hardships they suffered
together, a love which would give some transcendent meaning to their
long, lonely years spent at sea together. Ultimately, Ahab offered his
crew a vision of shipboard life as a community of love-for what else
is it when a group of men sacrifice and risk in response to a vision of
suffering of one among them.
Telling a group of hardened sailors that they are lonely and
spiritually yearning for love would probably not have worked very
well for Ahab, of course. This appeal had to be masked behind
something else, and that mask was the hatred of Moby Dick. Men
93. Id. at 181 (quoting MELVILLE, supra note 90, at 200).
94. Garland, Culture, supra note 5 at 351.
95. See infra Part IV.
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who could not look at one another and profess love could turn
together toward a vision of absolute evil and express hate, and in that
expression of hate they would be affirming in a safely obscured way
their love for all men who suffered the hardship of a seagoing life
together.
This is deep scapegoating at its most sublime. In the sections
which follow, I will argue that the inability of the crew of the Pequod
to affirm in a positive way the ties which bound them to one another
mirrors contemporary difficulties about defining our society's
common ground during a period of tremendous change. In crime, we
have found our own White Whale.
B. Contemporary Sources of Anxiety About Social Cohesion
Anxieties about the solidarity of our society have their roots in
the enormous economic, social, and ideological changes of the last
three decades. Economic life has changed in ways that have reduced
stability of employment for the average American household. Even
people who are doing well in this present time of unprecedented
prosperity worry that the job which supports their current standard of
living could disappear overnight. The inflation of the late seventies
and the recession of the early eighties profoundly destabilized the
American workplace, and the economic growth of the late eighties
and early nineties has created a prosperity which still feels unstable to
many. More recently, radical and rapid changes in economic fortunes
in certain industries and markets has created a great degree of
economic mobility-both downward and upward. Whether one's
neighbors moved out of the neighborhood because they suddenly lost
their old job and are moving down or because they cashed in their
newly appreciated stock options and are moving up, the anxious sense
of constant, unpredictable change is the same.96
During this same period of economic change, we have also seen
enormous social changes. Gender roles in the family and the work
place also began to change significantly during this time, and the end
of the resulting changes which have resulted in both family and
economic life are not yet in sight. During the fifties, sixties, and
seventies, marginalized racial and socioeconomic groups in our
society mobilized in both peaceful and violent ways to challenge
longstanding inequalities in our society. The burning cities and mass
protests of the sixties have given way to what feels like an intractable
96. See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF
THE MIDDLE CLASS (1989); WOLFE, supra note 48, at 261.
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political stalemate on issues of racial and socioeconomic equality. As
a result, Americans may be more aware of the diversity of their
society and more aware of the persistence of serious social, economic,
and political inequalities attendant to that diversity than at any other
point in our recent history. While the United States has always been
a diverse society afflicted with invidious forms of inequality, it is the
heightened awareness of these divisive aspects of our common life
which has created a marked anxiety about our ability to cohere as one
society.
Cultural and ideological developments during the last few
decades have heightened concerns about our solidarity as a society.
Whatever the term "Culture Wars" means, its constant and familiar
use to describe aspects of our civic discourse indicates a sense of
ongoing conflict between groups in our society which have very
different ways of looking at life. These cultural conflicts flow from
the growing pluralism of civic life as well as the changing social and
family formations which have developed over the last several
decades. Running through many of these conflicts is an articulated
concern that the diversity of our society has resulted in a sense of
right and wrong that may ultimately be too relativistic to provide a
clear framework for orderly and meaningful common life. The
politics of the period have also grown more divisive. Political rhetoric
has become progressively more antagonistic and more personality-
centered, and personal attacks seem to be the principle coin of the
political realm. Politicians often seem more bent on demonizing their
opposition than on working with them: whether you claim to be a
"New Democrat" or a "Compassionate Conservative," any effort at
consensus governance by one party is ruthlessly spun as "stealing our
ideas" by the other.
The last few decades may have also seen the ascendancy of what
Lawrence Friedman has labeled an "exaggerated individualism" in
which "one's main task in life is to forge a separate, unique self; to
develop one's potentialities" and where people's civic and social
obligations are not emphasized. 97 "The culture simply does not
encourage people to be modest, self-effacing, to submerge their egos,
to sacrifice their personal desires on the altar of some higher cause." 98
America has always been a strongly individualistic society, but that
aspect of our social character seems to have grown more pronounced
97. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 438
(1993).
98. Id. at 439.
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during this period of rapid social and economic change, and a growth
in individualism naturally implicates concerns about group solidarity.
Finally, social scientists have noted changes in the nature of
participation in civic activities which heighten concerns about social
cohesion. "At work and in their civic lives, people's ties are
increasingly instrumental, based less on a sense of loyalty and more
on the utilitarian benefits such ties can offer."99  Social scientist
Robert Putnam has argued that civic participation in America has
greatly declined and with it Americans sense of identification with
their communities, an argument which he based in part on his finding
that Americans are bowling alone more than in leagues.1°° In-depth
focus groups with middle-class respondents qualified Putnam's thesis,
finding that it was the quality and not the quantity of civic activity
which had declined.
[I]t is not the overall decline in group membership that is crucial-
for, when added up properly, there may not be that much of a
decline-but a change in the qualitative nature of those ties that
matters. Active engagement in social and civic life is important, not
as an end in itself, but because it expresses an altruistic desire to do
something for others. If, instead, people are joining groups to do
something for themselves-to win friends and influence people-
then society could experience a rise in organization memberships
and still be facing a situation of depleting social capital. 1 1
Community activities, in other words, were not engaged in for
the reasons which transcended personal interest, and in this sense
these activities merely reinforce anxieties about the absence of
transcendent values binding the community and the society together.
"[T]he fact that, in spite of their organizational activities, so many of
them believed that selfishness in America has increased suggests that,
in their view of the world, the quality of the social ties they
experience are not as rich as they ought to be."'1 2 Like the crew of
99. WOLFE, supra note 48, at 261.
100. Id. at 230 (citing ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000)).
101. Wolfe, supra note 48, at 261.
102. Id at 261-62. Ultimately, Wolfe concludes, however, that
Civic America... is not so much in decline as ... going through changes, and
those changes may be for the best, even if they do produce anxiety in the short
run. Instrumental ties clearly do not bind as tightly as those of family, church,
and community, but Americans have never liked to be bound that much at all.
Neighborhoods may-or may not-be quite as committed to an ethic of
belongingness, but, more important, people get to choose for themselves the
forms of their involvement with others.
Id. Middle-class Americans, Wolfe believes, understand that "all was not well at a time
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the Pequod, we labor alongside one another, feeling mutually
dependent but increasingly alone.
The sum result of these changes and divisions is a wide spread
and deeply felt sense of anxiety about the solidarity of contemporary
society. Books and articles discussing the anxious nature of civic life
have been numerous, and it is difficult to pick up a newspaper without
seeing this theme picked up in at least one story each day. It bears
emphasis that our society may be no more in flux now than it has
been during any other decade of the past tumultuous century. The
awareness of and anxiety about challenges to social cohesion do seem
to be at historically high levels, however.10 3
C. Social Cohesion and the Moral Panics of the Eighties and Nineties
Concentrating group hatred toward an unworthy object is at best,
however, a dysfunctional way to foster cohesion. The hunt for the
scapegoat diverts attention from the true sources of group concern-
those things which challenge our allegiance to the group and our love
for one another. The destruction of the scapegoat provides no
direction for the daily decisions which social life requires of us.
Furthermore, the sense of solidarity created by scapegoating is often
fleeting. With the lone exception of Ishmael, the teller of Melville's
dark tale, all of Ahab's crew perished in their effort to destroy Moby
Dick. Had they survived, one wonders how enduring would have
been the sense of solidarity created by their quest. For those with a
low threshold for self-deception there may be a moment of inner
when organizations and individuals were much more tightly bound together," and they
remain hopeful that someday the right balance will be found. Id.
103. A footnote which listed every book and article in the popular press picking up this
theme would run on for pages. See, e.g., MARTIN ANDERSON, IMPOSTERS IN THE
TEMPLE: AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS ARE DESTROYING OUR UNIVERSITIES AND
CHEATING OUR STUDENTS OF THEIR FUTURE (1992); EJ. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS
HATE POLITICS (1991); THOMAS BYRNE EDSAL. & MARY EDSAL, CHAIN REACTION:
THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); BARBARA
EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS (1989);
SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991); TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS
WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995); HAYNES JOHNSON, DIVIDED WE FALL (1990);
JOHN KATZ, VIRTUOUS REALITY: How AMERICA SURRENDERED DISCUSSION OF
MORAL VALUES TO OPPORTUNISTS, NITWITS AND BLOCKHEADS LIKE WILLIAM
BENNETr (1997); MARTIN MARTY, THE ONE AND THE MANY: AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR THE COMMON GOOD (1997); DANIEL PIPES, CONSPIRACY: HOW THE PARANOID
STYLE FLOURISHES AND WHERE IT COMES FROM (1998); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1994); CHARLES SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE
DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1993).
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truth after the destruction of the scapegoat when the individual
admits to himself the deception which he and his fellows have
willingly perpetrated upon themselves, a moment of recognition of
the absence of a relationship between the scapegoat and the social
pain that the group was trying to escape. Such moments can take a
toll on the very solidarity which all were so anxious to forge and
affirm in the first place. Ironically, the ephemeral quality of the false
solidarity which scapegoating creates may create a hunger for more of
the same. In an effort to escape once again its troubled sense of
reality, the group may look for its next sacrificial victim.
Like the alcoholic who lives from drink to drink, our society has
gone from one moral panic about crime to another during the last few
decades. Many of the public's major crime obsessions of the eighties
and nineties have proved to have been gross distortions of social
reality. Epidemics of child kidnapping, ritual satanic abuse, murders
by serial killers, juvenile violence, and crack cocaine addiction which
were exhaustively covered by the media have upon closer
examination turned out to be more fiction than fact. Each panic was
itself an exercise in deep scapegoating. In each case, a monstrous
type of offender (or in the case of crack cocaine a monstrous drug)
was imagined to be responsible for committing widespread crime, and
hyper-punitive strategies were adopted for dealing with the problem.
In each case, however, the problem was constructed in a way that
tapped into underlying anxieties about divisive social problems.
The scholars who have studied these panics in depth have come
to be known as "social constructionists" because they emphasize the
degree to which social problems are "constructed" by political elites,
the media, and activist groups as opposed to merely being
"discovered" by these groups in ready made form. Social
constructionists have examined a broad range of social problems and
the hallmark of their work has been a careful, empirical examination
of particular social problems at particular times.104 In studying these
moral panics, social constructionists have tended to focus their
attention on the role of interest groups in selling particular
constructions of a social problem to the public. My principal focus,
104. See, e.g., IMAGES OF ISSUES, supra note 82. For a discussion of the controversies
attendant to Constructionism, see Joel Best, But Seriously Folks: The Limitations of the
Strict Constructionist Interpretation of Social Problems, in CONSTRUCrIONIST
CONTROVERSIES: ISSUES IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS THEORY (Gale Miller & James A.
Holstein eds., 1998); Gary Fine, Scandal, Social Conditions, and the Creation of Public
Attention, 44 SOC. PROBS. 297 (1994); Erich Goode, Round Up the Usual Suspects: Crime,
Deviance, and the Limits of Constructionism, 94 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 90 (1994).
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however, is upon the anxieties about social cohesion to which these
rhetorical strategies have appealed, not the motivations and tactics of
those making the appeals. 10 5
(1) Random Violence
Just as Melville's Moby Dick really was responsible for the loss
of Ahab's leg, so too do some of the moral panics of our time have
their seeds of truth. Not all panics are built around urban legends
such as the "lights out" gang initiations of the early nineties.106 Often,
two or three crimes with a striking similar feature get packaged as a
"new crime problem." Joel Best has analyzed one such "mini-panic"
which flared briefly but never got off the ground: freeway shootings
in the summer of 1987.107
The story began when reporters juxtaposed stories of two shootings
on L.A. freeways during the same June weekend. When a third
shooting occurred a few weeks later, the press declared that they
had spotted a trend, and for three weeks in late July and early
August, news stories about L.A.'s 'road warriors' riding 'hair-
trigger highways' attracted national attention.... However, it soon
became obvious that freeway violence was not spreading across the
country or increasing in southern California; it was not even all that
common in L.A. 08
Other panics take hold of more substantial categories of crime and
exaggerate them to epidemic proportions. During the mid-eighties
for example, numerous media reported that the United States was
experiencing a serial murder epidemic. 0 9
The media reports repeated the claims of a Justice Department
official that as many as 4,000 Americans a year, or about 20 percent
of all homicide victims, were murdered by serial killers .... It
turned out that the numbers of serial murders reported by the
federal government were fake. In effect, the government
interpretation made every one of the 4,000 or so unsolved murders
in the United States a "serial killer." It was later shown that there
were only about fifty to sixty murders per year by serial killers
105. Cf. Fine, supra note 104, at 297 (arguing that social constructionism "systematically
neglects the conditions that produce the recognition of social problems" and that
"sociologists should analyze conditions that generate public attention, seeing structure as
providing constraints on interpretations").
106. See BEST, supra note 78, at 1-2.
107. See id. at 4.
108. Id.
109. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 68.
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between 1971 and 1987.110
Sometimes, very diverse types of crime are packaged together in a
way that purports to represent a pattern. Best, for example, has
tracked the appearance of the expression "random violence" in major
newsmagazines and newspapers and identified a four-year period of
peak usage from 1989 to 1993.111 "This usage corresponds to the rise
of several moral panics about new crimes during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, including freeway violence (1987), wilding (1989),
stalking (beginning around 1990), kids and guns (1991), carjacking
and ankle grabbing (both 1992), lights-out gang initiations (1993), and
sexual predators (1994), to say nothing of other concerns-such as
serial murder (1984) and drive-by shootings (1985)-that maintained
high levels of visibility."'
12
(2) Crack Cocaine
Moral panics sometimes represent an existing problem as
spreading to hitherto untouched areas of society. Perhaps, the most
extreme example of such a construction occurred when the President
of the United States began a national address by holding up a bag
containing crack cocaine, which he claimed was seized during a sale
which took place across the street from the White House. This
particular claim turned out to be a "construction" in the most literal
sense of the word.
"The idea of the President holding up crack was first included in
some drafts" of his speech by advisors.... [President] Bush and his
advisors decided that the crack should be seized in Lafayette Park
across from the White House or nearby so that the President could
say that crack had become so pervasive that men were "selling
drugs in front of the White House".... Despite their best efforts,
top Federal drug agents were not able to find anyone selling crack
(or any other drug) in Lafayette Park, or anywhere else in the
vicinity of the White House. Therefore, to carry out their
assignment, DEA agents had to entice someone to come to the
Park to make the sale. Apparently, the only person the DEA could
convince was Keith Jackson, an 18-year old African-American high
school senior.... The DEA's secret tape recording of the
conversation revealed that the teenager seemed baffled by the
request: "Where the [expletive deleted] is the White House?" he
asked. [The DEA agent] told the Post, "we had to manipulate him
110. Id.
111. See BEST, supra note 78, at 6-7.
112. Id.
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to get him down there. It wasn't easy."" 3
The President's claim dramatized a widespread-and to a great
degree ongoing-scare about the prevalence of crack cocaine in
society. During the mid to late eighties, a barrage of media coverage
described crack cocaine use in the terms of a growing epidemic.
Crack was routinely described as a drug of unparalleled addictive
powers: it was widely reported that youth often became addicted
after a single incident of use, for example. These reports emphasized
that crack use was spreading to white suburban neighborhoods where
hard drug use was virtually unknown. All of these claims were either
baseless or highly disputable." 4 Despite widespread media reports
during the eighties that crack had invaded the suburbs and the middle
class, crack use was mainly confined to poor, urban neighborhoods., 15
The best data available on use of cocaine during the mid-eighties
suggests that cocaine use had begun declining around the same time
that the "crack epidemic" was supposed to be taking off. (The same
data suggests that cocaine use has continued to decline ever since).11
6
At the beginning of the crack scare, there was no data distinguishing
use of cocaine in its powder form from the crystalline form known as
crack (despite widespread representations that crack use was
skyrocketing). 117 Once distinctions were introduced into the studies,
the data disproved claims that crack was "instantly addicting." The
vast majority of people who have tried crack did not continue using
it.118 Far from being "instantly addicting," most of those interviewed
in formal studies describe the crack rush as being "too intense" and
"extremely unpleasant." 19 Apparently, crack is to powder cocaine
what moonshine is to liquor: typically only the poorest and most
desperate can bring themselves to use it enough to get addicted to
it.120
113. Craig Reinarman & Harry Levine, The Crack Attack- American's Latest Drug
Scare, 1986-1992 in IMAGES OF ISSUES, supra note 82.
114. See id. at 156-60.
115. See id. at 150.
116. See id. at 163-65.
117. See id. at 164.
118. Much has been made of the different type of "rush" or "high" which crack users
experienced. Free-basing cocaine provides the same pharmacological effect as smoking
crack, however, and free-basing preceded crack by a number of years. Crack was
principally a marketing innovation, and smoking cocaine in its crystal form is nothing
more than a "poor man's" method of freebasing. See id. at 151-52.
119. Id. at 149.
120. Reinarman and Levine refer to the framing of worst cases as typical cases in drug
war discourse as an example of "routinization of caricature," a pattern where the episodic
becomes "rhetorically recrafted into the epidemic." Id at 160.
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(3) Juvenile Violence
One of the on-again, off-again panics of the last two decades has
related to juvenile violence. Perhaps, the most evocative variation on
this theme was the "juvenile superpredator, ' '121 a construction which
observers of juvenile justice have seen again and again.
With rising concern over urban violence in the 1980s and
1990s came the recycling of the familiar 'new breed' theory
of young offenders-with the implicit focus on the young
black male offender.... Politicians and human service
professionals alike periodically call the public's attention to
this ostensibly more unfeeling, cold, and dangerous young
offender who now stalks our streets.
122
One of the more recent claims of this particular panic is that a
demographic bulge in the juvenile age group will result in a "coming
storm of juvenile violence."'123 Once again, however, empirical
research tells a different story. A recent study concluded that
"juvenile crime has been on the decline for the past four years" and
that "over the past 20 years, there has been no sustained trend of
either increases or decreases in juvenile violence. ' 124 Furthermore,
the study debunked the coming explosion of juvenile violence as
"science fiction rather than social science."
One much-trumpeted prediction, for example, claimed that there
will be an additional 270,000 extremely violent young people by the
year 2010. However, that statistic, which was widely reported in the
national media, included all young people under 18-even babies.
The major influences on the amount of serious youth violence in
the United States over the next decade will not be an increase in
the number of adolescents.
125
(4) Child Kidnapping and the Sexual Abuse and Murder of Children
In Moral Panic, Phillip Jenkins analyzed at length moral panics
of the forties and eighties about the sexual abuse of children in
American society.126 "At these times, concern over sexual abuse
provides a basis for extravagant claims-making by professionals, the
media, and assorted interest groups, who argue that the problem is
quantitatively and qualitatively far more severe than anyone could
121. WILLIAM J. BENNET ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND HOW TO
WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996).
122. Miller, supra note 5, at 37-38.
123. BENNET ET AL., supra note 121.
124. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1999).
125. Id.
126. See JENKINS, supra note 4, at 7.
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reasonably suppose."'127 Jenkins reminds us of some of the more
incredible beliefs that these panics involved, most of which involved
monstrous offenders operating in unimaginable numbers.
It comes to be believed that legions of sex fiends and homicidal
predators stalk the land, that the number of active pedophiles runs
into the millions, that tens of thousands of children are abducted
and killed each year, that sinister cults have infiltrated preschools
and kindergartens across the country, that incest affects one-fourth
or even one-half of young girls, that child pornography is an
industry raking in billions of dollars and preying on hundreds of
thousands of American youngsters every year.'28
Such beliefs have proven to be false. Jenkins contrasts "claims,
frequently aired in the 1980s, that many thousands were killed each
year by serial murderers, pornographers, or pedophile rings" with the
fact that between 1980 and 1994, an average of five children under the
age of twelve per year were murdered by strangers during a sexual
assault. 29 Jenkins's calculation, however, may understate the annual
number of sexual murders of children because it does not deal with
missing children, some of whom very well may have been victims of
sexual murder. The number of children kidnapped, however, has
been the subject of the most extreme exaggeration. In 1985, the
director of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
claimed that "at least twenty to fifty thousand kids are abducted each
year in the United States and are never seen again." Others claimed
the figure was closer to 1.5 million each year.130 It is widely agreed
that these claims were gross exaggerations. 131 One estimate places the
number of abductions of children by strangers since the late seventies
as ranging from 50 to 150 per year.132 Using a broad definition of the
problem, the Justice Department's National Incidence Study on
Missing, Abducted, Runaway and Thrownaway Children estimated
that there were approximately 200-300 abductions in 1988 "where the
127. Id.
128. Id. Perhaps the most pervasive symbol of the child abuse scare of the eighties was
the appearance of missing children on milk cartons. A Pulitzer Prize winning investigation
by The Denver Post revealed that 95 % of "missing children" were actually runaway teens,
or children taken by parents during custody disputes. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMM'N, supra note 5, at 67.
129. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 10.
130. See id. at 132.
131. See id. at 133.
132. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 67 (stating that
actual abductions by strangers since the late seventies have ranged from 50 to 150 per
year).
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child was gone overnight, killed, or transported fifty miles or there
was evidence of intent to keep the child permanently" and that
somewhere between 43 and 147 children are murdered each year as a
result of stranger abductions.
133
It bears repeating the many of the crimes at the center of these
panics do happen, they are just nowhere near as widespread-either
geographically or in terms of frequency-as the frenzy surrounding
them might suggest. During the freeway shooting scare of 1987, for
example, approximately eight million people lived in Los Angeles
county. The fact that three of them fired guns at someone while on
the freeway during a two month period of time is certainly a little
strange, but it should not have been interpreted as the dawn of a new
age in urban violence either in Los Angeles or nationally. I also do
not mean to minimize the enormous suffering that these crimes
involve for the individuals affected. Crack cocaine use does
enormous damage to the lives of the urban poor and to the
communities in which they live: my point is that the "crack scare" of
a monster drug addicting the previously unaddictable was a myth.
Similarly, stranger abductions of children is a heart-stopping crime, a
true story of violation of the sacred if there ever was one, and the idea
that this crime may happen to one hundred and fifty families in a year
is horrifying. Ironically, exaggerating the numbers of those afflicted
by terrible crimes may ultimately desensitize us to the suffering
involved, however. For example, Paula Fass has suggested that
exaggeration of the frequency of stranger abductions of children
ultimately generates not real concern but mere "alarm," an emotion
which actually obscures the nature of the loss for the individuals
involved.
What kind of solace can it give to know that each year "only" 200
to 300 children disappear into the worst horror imaginable, beyond
mere taboo, into the land of the lost? The figures only seem small
when compared to the initial inflation used to fan the campaign in
the 1980s. We need to cut away the inflation to be properly
stunned by the real numbers.... Americans love huge numbers
because they are a portend of a plague, but once we think of these
children as individuals.., rather than just the changing faces on
Advo cards, then each child is a serious wound. The numbers are a
cheat; only the children are real. To each parent, the loss is
incalculable.... The campaign of numbers may well obscure the
most important meaning of "missing," the one that brings people
133. FASS, supra note 4, at 244.
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out to volunteer: a profound sense of loss for a particular child.134
D. The Role of Claimsmaking and the Media
During these panics, battles were often waged between activist
groups over how the problem of child abuse would be framed or
constructed for the rest of society.135 For example, arguments over
whether the danger of sexual exploitation of children came from
within or without the family, for example, were attempts by different
activist groups to frame the problem in a way that advanced different
agendas. "The rival approaches differ vastly in their appeal and in the
policy solutions implied: if the incest view lent support to far-
reaching critiques of current social organization and gender roles, the
stranger-molester concept was compatible with a conservative
rhetoric of law and order, public decency, and moral reintegration.1 36
"In the 1880s as in the 1980s, publicizing threats to children enabled
feminists to draw attention to pervasive male violence and
exploitation and thus identify problems that could be resolved only by
structural changes in gender relations."' 37 Focusing on children as
victims of male violence in the household also undermined a "blame-
the-victim" mentality which had allowed the portrayal of spousal rape
and battery as "consensual.' ' 38 The ultimate "ascendancy of the
predator theme" was, in Jenkin's view, a major victory for moral
conservatives and a major compromise by child-protection advocates.
The larger point, however, is that the construction of the problem of
child sexual abuse was the product of a process between groups with
competing worldviews that nonetheless shared an interest in
promoting a particular social phenomenon as a "crime problem."1
39
134. Id. at 254.
135. Katherine Beckett has provided one of the most comprehensive and persuasive
accounts of the severity revolution as a product of masterful rhetorical inflections by
political elites with a vested political interest in depicting the underclass as irredeemably
deviant. See generally KATHERINE BEcKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS (1997). Rejecting accounts of the severity revolution as
"democracy in action," Beckett describes the development of a discourse in which "the
criminality, addiction, and delinquency of the impoverished-as well as their dependence
of public assistance-symbolize their immorality, dangerousness, and preference for the
'easy way out'." Il at 107.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id. at 217.
138. See id.
139. See JENKINS, supra note 4. Jenkins noted that the campaign against sexual abuse
of children also permitted conservative groups to covertly attack certain groups and issues.
For example, the campaign against sex offenders in the 1940's heavily targeted
homosexuals because of an association of homosexuality with the victimization of
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It is tempting to blame these panics solely on the efforts of such
activist groups, the media, or politicians to spread crime fear. To do
so, however, might be "scapegoating the scapegoaters," in the sense
that it would divert attention away from our own eagerness to believe
the fears which are being packaged.
The best argument against seeing claimsmakers and the media as
the cause of moral panics, however, is the variability of our
susceptibility to moral panics over time.140 Not every age lends itself
to moral panics. Crime panics about the sexual abuse and murder of
children are clearly not "created" by notorious crimes against
children for example. The protection of children would seem to be a
sacrosanct theme in any age, but Jenkins notes that not every age
lends itself to such exaggerated fears about the abuse of children.
Crime panics are not created by notorious crimes. Every decade
provides a number of lurid crimes that command national attention
and revulsion, but these narratives do not always trigger movements
children. "Stigmatization of this sort was a common phenomenon in the framing of sexual
offenses, as claims-makers drew attention to one issue because it symbolized another that
could not be attacked directly." Id, at 17. This pattern extended also to attacks on
pornography and to attacks on fringe religious groups. Involving children in the activity
attacked changed the moral climate around the issue and permitted the same targets to be
attacked under the guise of child protection. See id.
The success of these covert attacks reveals an interesting rhetorical strategy for
overcoming constitutional protections. In each case, a core constitutional right was
implicated and in each case the involvement of children was used to raise the stakes in a
way that put invocation of the right at odds with the sacred interest of child protection:
privacy in the case of gay rights; freedom of speech in the case of pornography; and
freedom of religion in the case of religious cults. What emerges is a strategy for
delegitimizing statutory and constitutional protections by focusing public attention on
extreme and unlikely contexts where those rights might conceivably shelter someone who
intends to violate a sacred core value.
140. It is important to concede that the more vivid form of modern media such as
television and the perhaps unprecedented degree to which they saturate popular culture
and daily life may have enlarged the responsibility which the media bears for moral panics.
Still, the literature exploring the connection between the media and attitudes towards
crime and criminal justice does not lend itself to unambiguous conclusions about cause
and effect. See generally WILLIAM HALTON, REPORTING ON THE COURTS: HOW THE
MASS MEDIA COVER JUDICIAL ACTIONS (1998); DENNIS HowiTr, CRIME, THE MEDIA
AND THE LAW (1998); NANCY SIGNORIELLI & GEORGE GERBNER, VIOLENCE AND
TERROR IN THE MASS MEDIA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1988); RICHARD
SPARKS, TELEVISION AND THE DRAMA OF CRIME: MORAL TALES AND THE PLACE OF
CRIME IN PUBLIC LIFE (1992). For a more focused discussion of the ways in which media-
treatment of crime has shaped the political environment of crime debates on sentencing
policy, see Robert Mosteller, The United States Perspective on the Judicial Role in
Sentencing: A Story of Small Victories and a Call for Partial Solutions in a Difficult
Environment 260-64, in THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (John Doran &
Sean Doran eds.) (forthcoming 2000).
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to reform the criminal justice system. For example, one offender in
California in the late nineteen-twenties murdered twenty children; in
the early seventies roughly thirty sex murders were committed by a
single man in Texas; and in the late fifties, a man committed a series
of sensational sexual murders which inspired the widely seen movie
Psycho.141 In each case, the crimes attracted enormous national
attention, but the crimes were not fit into a larger story about sexual
deviance or the victimization of children. In the case of the Texas
murders, an ongoing liberalization of laws regulating sexual conduct
proceeded apace.142 In our present mind set, it is hard to imagine how
a case involving the murder of twenty or thirty children could fail to
result in some sort of ratcheting-up of criminal sentences. Clearly, the
soil must be fertile for a moral panic to take hold.
Furthermore, the recent panic about school shootings makes it
clear that some crimes need no packaging to trigger a
disproportionate public panic. During the previous year, there were
three occasions on which high school students have gone to school
armed with guns and shot a number of their classmates and teachers.
Nobody could exaggerate the frequency of this sort of crime because
each and every incident receives enormous media coverage instantly,
and no exaggeration of the monstrosity of what happened was
necessary to shock and horrify the public. One incident in
particular-the shootings at Columbine High School by two teenage
boys who planned their attack long in advance and who killed not just
remorselessly but exultantly-has captured the public's imagination
in a way that no other single crime has in recent memory. Parents all
over the country have kept their children home from school, and
countless schools are tightening security and developing contingency
plans for a similar attack.
No one had to nourish public fears that a Columbine-type
shooting could happen again and again. That fear was born full
grown. Yet the widespread fear of school shootings created by the
Columbine shootings deserves the same sort of skeptical appraisal
which has exposed the moral panics which have gone before it. The
United States is a nation with a population of over a quarter of a
billion people. Millions of teenagers go to school each day. Within
one year, three groups of them did something that was terrible. The
probability of falling victim to such an attack is far less than
thousands of other much more mundane risks which American
141. See JENKINS, supra note 4, at 221-22.
142. See id.
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teenagers already live with. More high school students probably die
in an average week of motor vehicle accidents than have died in the
past year in all school shootings of any description-not just the
multiple shootings of recent note.143 Even granting the possibility
that there may have been a copycat relationship among the crimes, a
possibility which might make future school attacks slightly more
probable, why do so many Americans expect this sort of attack to
happen at their local school? Why don't they just see it as a bizarre
anomaly like the year in the mid-eighties during which four times as
many people died in commercial airliner crashes as in the previous
year? 144 The school shootings of the last year are most probably a
series of freak occurrences which say little about future probabilities
in a country as populous as our own, but they don't feel that way to
many American parents.
(1) The "Marketplace of Fears"
The reason why crimes such as school shootings, serial killings,
and other monstrous offenses terrify us so is because they tap into
deep seated anxieties about the changing nature of social life. People
put down their newspaper and wonder "what sort of society are we
becoming that breeds children such as these?" The crime is not seen
as an aberration: it is seen as expressing something fundamental
about social life in America. You are only prone to see in monstrous
crimes some deeper indictment of contemporary society if you were
already deeply anxious about society to begin with.
Phillips Jenkins has offered an arresting metaphor to explain why
143. Nationally, the number of students killed in all types of violent incidents at schools
has remained constant, staying at about 55 each year over the last decade. See Hanna
Rosin & Claudia Deane, Teens Report Seeing Signs of Violence; One-Third in Poll Say
They've Had Threats, DALLAS MORNING NEws, April 27, 1999, at 9A. On the other
hand, motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for people in the 15 to 20 year-
old age group. In 1997, 7,885 such drivers were involved in fatal crashes. See NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., YOUNG DRIVER TRAFFIC
SAFETY FAcrs (1997). This fatality figure includes only the deaths of teenagers who were
driving at the time of the accident (and not the deaths of teenage passengers), yet if one
assumes that only half of the yearly figure were school age (15-18), then three times as
many high school students die behind the wheel of a car each week on average than die all
year in all manner of violent incidents at all schools in the county. Similarly, 365,000
individuals in the 15 to 20 age group were injured in motor-vehicle crashes in 1997, and the
overall economic cost of these crashes is estimated at slightly over $30 billion. See id.
144. Nineteen eighty-four was the safest year since 1970 for commercial aviation in
terms of fatalities and 1985 was one of the deadliest. Two thousand three hundred and
sixty-two people died in such plane crashes in 1985 whereas only 624 had died during the
previous year. See Aviation Safety Network, Statistics, (visited Aug. 25, 1999)
<http://aviation-safety.net/statistics/index.html>.
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certain anxieties capture the public imagination at some times but not
at others: a "market place for fears."
The lesson seems to be the one so often found in studies of social
problems: that claims about danger are rather like commodities in
a competitive marketplace, items that gain or lose a following
depending on how well retailers strike a chord among the
consumers whom they wish to attract. The products themselves,
although they may be packaged with greater or less sophistication,
remain fairly constant: their success in gaining market share
depends on the composition and tastes of the consumers, which
change over time. Problems rise and fall, evolve and mutate,
depending on such intertwined factors as demographic changes,
shifting gender expectations, economic strains, and racial conflicts
as well as the social, political, and religious ideologies built upon
these underlying realities.
45
Under this view, crime fear competes for attention with other types of
social danger. The ascendancy of crime as a social problem
commanding disproportionate public attention and resources cannot
be attributed merely to "packaging" by activist groups because other
activist groups are packaging competing products. Furthermore, the
cyclical nature of some of the crime panics demonstrates that the
success of the packaging efforts varies over time. Ultimately, the
success of crime as a product in the competitive market of social fear
turns upon "the composition and tastes of the consumer.
'146
The radical increase of crime's "market share" of social concern
can be linked with the sorts of anxieties about change and flux in
society which have been discussed above. For example, stories of
random violence in general may tap into concerns about the growing
anonymity of our increasingly mobile society. Jenkins linked the
revival of fears about "sex offenders," from the mid-nineteen thirties
through the mid-nineteen fifties to larger concerns about the
tremendous changes American society underwent during those years.
"Claims struck a powerful chord among large sections of the
145. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 216 (citations omitted).
146. Id. Michael Tonry has offered an interesting explanation of the role of moral
panics in the severity of our punishment. He suggests first that as a historical matter moral
panics seem to occur cyclically. He further argues that we happen to have experienced
such a cycle during a period of time when crime rates happened to be moving upward.
"The misfortune of our time is that long-term deviance cycles during which intolerance
and excessive severity are to be expected have coincided with a series of moral panics, and
the long-term cycles and the short-term panics have each exacerbated the other's effects."
Tonry, Rethinking, supra note 43, at 1771-86. My argument in this section can be
understood as an attempt to portray our susceptibility to moral panics as not merely
cyclical but as rooted in a specific social context.
[Vol. 51
THE SEARCH FOR SOLIDARITY
population: the sexual menace focused ill-defined fears resulting
from social upheavals at this time, which were causing a radical
redefinition of gender roles and family obligations."'147 With respect
to contemporary concerns, Jenkins argues that "panics about sex
offenders are closely related to other fears, from anxieties about
youth crime to worries about drug abuse, a link that partly explains
why concerns about sex crimes have so frequently acquired similar
ideological directions, emphasizing external monster figures,
psychopaths, and predators." Fears about child abuse by strangers
probably also express a more general fear of modern life: the fear
that in the free-for-all of contemporary society children will come
under the influence of some drug, some rock group, some "wrong
crowd," or "wrong idea" that will harm or alienate them.
Stories about crime involving children in particular tap into a
complex of concerns about modern life. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
so many of the moral panics of the nineties involved children in either
a victim or an offender role (or in the case of drug use, both victim
and offender). Anxieties about the direction of changes in modern
life are felt perhaps most acutely by those confronted with the task of
preparing children to cope with those changes.
The parents in Alan Wolfe's comprehensive study of middle class
attitudes expressed these sorts of anxieties in strong terms. "[T]he
subject of children tended to bring out a language of doom-and-
gloom: stress, despair, pressure, exposure-these are the words
middle-class Americans use when they talk about the lives of their
children. ' 148 The source of this anxiety was the choices which modern
society confronted children. "Kids ... respondents believed, deserve
a safe haven, but arrayed against them are all those forces of modern
life that make it hard to raise children the way most parents think
children should be raised.' 149 Middle-class parents expected to find
such safe havens in the suburbs and have not.
As they watch stories on television about the conditions of inner-
city life, what bothers them most is how poor kids are introduced to
sex, violence, and drugs long before they have the emotional and
physical capacity to understand their attractions and dangers. Now,
to their astonishment, they find their own children facing these
same choices.15
0
147. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 16.
148. WOLFE, supra note 48, at 116.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 199.
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Clearly stated among the middle-class parents Wolfe interviewed was
an anxiety that they were unable to inculcate the values their children
would need to make good choices.
Middle-class moral pessimism stems not from the fact that raising
children is difficult.... but from the powerlessness of parents to
instill middle-class values. When such values work, our
respondents believe, they can protect kids against their own
temptations, delaying the moment of choice until children are
mature enough to face them. But middle class values, they also
believe, rarely work. The citadel has been invaded, and the lure of
pleasure is impossible to resist.
151
(2) The Violent Sexual Predator as an Archetypal Scapegoat
Concerns about sexual predators of children offer an archetypal
example of the ways in which a monstrous offender can serve as a
vessel into which society can pour far ranging concerns about the
difficulties of protecting children in contemporary society. During
the ongoing child abuse panic of the eighties and nineties, the sexual
predator served as scapegoat for problems that are both subtler and
far more difficult to deal with. The essence of scapegoating lies in the
attribution of an internal problem to an external source. In the
contemporary child abuse scare, the violent sexual predator of
children, whose sexual appetites and violent tendencies are so deviant
from social norms as to place them outside of normal society, is that
external source. The violent sexual predator becomes a scapegoat,
however, when the scope of social suffering laid at his feet is far
greater than the facts merit, when a problem that is actually internal
to society is projected on to someone who is clearly outside of society
in an important sense of the word. For example, focusing our
attention on the violent sexual predator diverts our attention from the
difficult and often divisive issues raised by issues of child abuse within
151. Id. at 120-21. Many of the choices which middle-class parents feared were the
products of wealth, not of poverty. Materialism provided a challenge at least as corrosive
as the challenge of sex and drugs.
Modern parents with young children worry not that their kids will lack choices,
but that they will have too many; reluctant choosers when it comes to their own
lives, they are unambiguously upset about the number of options their kids have.
Personal telephone lines, answering machines, expensive clothes, cars-these are
the things kids want. For some parents, the question is not whether they can
afford them-they can-but whether they ought to satisfy the cravings of their
children for material things.... If they say yes, they worry about spoiling their
children. If they say no, they worry that they will lose control over their children.
Id. at 118.
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the family. How does the state monitor what goes on within a
household's walls? How should the credibility of children be assessed
and when do therapeutic techniques for eliciting stories of abuse from
children become dangerously suggestive? What role should the
cultural background of a family play in drawing the line between
reasonable corporal punishment and a criminal assault against a
child? Instead of dwelling on these potentially divisive issues, society
draws comfort from the feeling of oneness which results when we
contemplate the truly horrible deeds of someone like Richard Allen
Davis, the man convicted of kidnapping twelve year old Polly Klaas
out of her living room during a slumber party and subsequently
strangling her to death in a vacant field.152
The somewhat apocryphal-apocryphal in the sense that there
are not anywhere near as many of them as we are apparently willing
to believe-specter of the violent sexual predator becomes a vessel
into which society pours even more inchoate anxieties about children
and childbearing. Society's eagerness to obsess about the dangers of
strangers stalking their children probably owes much to the increasing
anonymity of our urban and suburban neighborhoods whose
members are nowhere near as well known to one another as a result
of the general social flux described above. Within the home, family
and work arrangements which have increased the number of
"latchkey" children who are either unsupervised or who must be
entrusted to day care centers or some other non-family member
create guilt and worry which coalesce around any threat to children
which can be personified and then attacked. 153
152. Others have seen our society's obsession with child predators as an attempt to
divert attention from society's general neglect of more widespread threats to child welfare.
As a society, we seem to be alarmed for our children and our neighbors' children
only when the danger is of the most extreme kind. But the dangers are much
more pervasive-bad health, bad schools, unsafe streets, unsafe environments of
all kinds threaten all our children. When we protect our children amidst the
alarm created by stories of kidnappings, do we turn our backs on the welfare of
other children or even on knowledge of their condition? Kidnap stories have
always haunted middle-class families, whose obsessive concerns for their
children's future were illuminated by the stories of loss and endangerment. In a
society in which we are supposed to love our children, does it really require that
we feel threatened with their abduction to attend to their needs and the needs of
their schoolmates?
FASS, supra note 4, at 263.
153. See id. at 255 ("It is surely not accidental that so much of the most recent fear of
kidnapping has come at a time when women have left their children in larger and larger
numbers to the care of others. The lurking (often sexual) suspicion of child-care centers
and child-care providers is part of this same deep sense of missing one's own children, of
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Overall, the social construction of the problem of the sexual
abuse of children illustrates perfectly the scapegoating of monstrous
offenders as a way of dealing with deeply felt social anxieties. "In the
familiar anthropomorphic process that shapes our response to other
problems, the issue of sex offenses is personalized, and once
identified, monsters can be defeated, captured, and killed. '154 The
sexual predator of children provides "a vision of crime that
lawmakers fervently want to believe: a place where sexual violence
can be isolated and treated, where the evil lurking in the land can be
corralled and eliminated... a symbol of the deepest evil." 155
A grave problem with the child sex abuse panics in Jenkins' view
was that they distorted the nature of the actual problem. The abuse
of children in American society is in fact widespread, but frantic
beliefs about monstrous strangers diverted attention away from the
real sources of danger to children. The majority of child murders that
do occur are committed by parents or family members. 156 Jenkins
juxtaposes the low figures for sex killings "alongside the hundreds of
child murders caused each year by physical maltreatment, neglect,
and torture, usually at the hands of parents or other family members
or intimates" and concludes that the exclusive framing of child abuse
in sexual terms diverts reform efforts from the "true problem.' 157 As
a result, "lawmakers misdiagnosed the problem, wasted resources on
ineffective solutions and caused problems which had nothing to do
with child abuse."'158 Unfortunately, with respect to the interests of
children, society had opted for easy instead of true targets.
(3) Hunting for Monsters with a Drag-Net
Ahab hunted Moby Dick with a harpoon, but the moral panics of
fear for their identities and their safety over which parents seem to have less and less
control.").
154. JENKINS, supra note 4 at 237.
155. Matthew Stadler, Stalking the Predator, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at A23, quoted
in JENKINS, supra note 4, at 237.
156. See JENKINS, supra note 4, at 237.
157. Id. at 11. Jenkins noted another way in which these panics distorted the problem:
any term used to describe someone who committed a sexual offense against a child quickly
took on the worst possible meaning. "When technical terms enter general discourse and
the mass media, their meanings become vastly aggravated through frequent retellings and
come to imply compulsive violence and monstrous perversion directed against the
youngest and most vulnerable." Id. Jenkins described efforts by experts to "introduce
new and more objective words to describe sexual criminals, only to find that later the
terms acquire the worst connotations; this is the fate that has befallen in succession, sex
offender, molester, and pedophile." See id. at 8.
158. Id. at 7.
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the eighties and nineties have engendered policies that capture far too
many small fish. Like a giant drag-net stretched across leagues of
ocean, three-strikes laws and other mandatory minimum laws have
scooped up far too many minor offenders. Each of the moral panics
of the eighties and nineties has contributed to the indiscriminate
nature of the severity revolution. "During the crack scare, the prison
population more than doubled, largely because of the arrests of drug
users and small dealers."' 59 The juvenile crime scare has resulted in
widespread reforms aimed at treating many juveniles as adults and
incarcerating them earlier and for longer periods of time.16 Concerns
about random violence have manifested themselves in various "get
tough" measures that have fallen predominantly on minor offenders,
such as "Three Strikes" laws.'
61
Sometimes the indiscriminate nature of these policies develops
under a theory that minor offenses lead to major ones. For example,
Jenkins describes how nonviolent sexual offenses frequently became
the focal point of the energies unleashed by concern about sexual
abuse of children: concern about sexual violence was transformed
into concern about sexual deviancy.
Because child murder and forcible rape are already treated with the
utmost gravity, claims-makers must turn their attention to
behaviors that, while not obviously harmful in themselves, are cited
as precursors of violence. Activists present minor sexual offences
as stepping-stones culminating in unacceptable violence and
therefore deserving our condemnation. Outrage at random
violence is transformed into a largely symbolic crusade against the
nonviolent and thus squanders resources on the mildly deviant. 162
Under this particular "stepping-stone" theory of conduct, "there is no
such thing as a minor sexual offense, in that acts like exhibitionism,
voyeurism, and sexual interference with children are potentially all
symptoms of damaging pathological violence.'
63
Zimring and Hawkins have described a more direct connection
between minor and major offenders which they term "categorical
contagion," a concept which they have illustrated in the context of the
Three Strikes initiative in California. The inclusion of residential
159. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 113, at 174.
160. See ZIMRING, supra note 124, at 13.
161. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME is NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 182-83 (1997) (stating that two-thirds of offenders
affected by the Three Strikes law in California are non-violent offenders).
162. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 9.
163. Id.
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burglary as a "strike" tripled the cost of the initiative for the state of
California, yet public support for including residential burglary was
high. Zimring and Hawkins argue that the fear generated by the
kidnap-murder of Polly Klaas from her living room spilled over onto
the scenario of a residential burglary. "The fear generated by the
kidnap and murder of Polly Klaas in California provokes long
sentences for residential burglars because the burglar in the citizen's
scenario has acquired the characteristics of Polly Klaas' killer." 64
The contamination of the public's response to one category of crime
by fears generated by another is categorical contagion. The result is
that "citizens come to fear many forms of criminal behavior because
they imagine them all committed by extremely violent
protagonists.' ' 165
(4) Monstrous Conceptions and Determinate Sentencing
The pervasive tendency to interpret abstract categories of crime
in terms of the worst case influences the formation of sentencing
policy at a very fundamental level. Consider the following newspaper
story:
CHILD-ABUSE MEASURE APPROVED BY HOUSE
Child abusers who cause severe, long-term injuries would face more
than three years in prison for a first-time offense under a bill
unanimously approved by the House.
House members... approved a change in the bill that would apply
the same punishment to anyone who intentionally allows severe
abuse to occur.... Rep. Wayne Goodwin... said state law now
allows people to avoid prison for their first conviction for severe
child abuse.16
6
In the abstract, such a bill might sound reasonable to the average
American. Intentional infliction of severe, long-term injuries to
children is a serious crime and the statute does include those words.
Indeed, it would be a brave political figure who would vote against
such a bill. He or she would always be vulnerable to the simple
charge that he or she had voted against a bill that would have made
sure that a child abuser who severely injures a child goes to prison-
he or she would always be vulnerable to the charge of being "soft on
crime." Yet, a close reading of the statute and case law which would
164. Id. at 12-13.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Child-Abuse Measure Approved by House, THE NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), March 23, 1999, at 3A (from wire service reports) (emphasis added).
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be used to interpret the statute reveals that "child" includes someone
who is fifteen years old and "severe injury" could mean a knocked
out tooth, or a lump on the head.167 While striking a teenager and
raising a lump or knocking out a tooth is inexcusable, that same
average American would probably not want the judge to have no
choice but to sentence a parent committing such an offense to three
years in prison-even if the crime were his first offense of any kind.
The same average American who might have bought the "soft on
crime" argument would probably want the judge in such a case to at
least have the option of sentencing the defendant to probation with
mandatory counseling and close supervision.
168
IV. Willie Horton and the Rhetoric of Risk Assessment
I think when you're dealing with people that are this dangerous and
this violent, anything short of 100 percent is not successful. I mean,
you can't get any guarantees that they're not going to harm
somebody else.
- Cliff Barnes, a victim of Willie Horton' 69
Perhaps the single most politically influential crime story of
recent years was the Willie Horton controversy of the late eighties.
Horton was a convicted first-degree murderer who raped, robbed,
and terrorized a white suburban couple after being released from a
Massachusetts prison pursuant to a furlough program. What made his
case especially noteworthy for many was that at the time of this
offense he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for first degree murder. This furlough program
became a national issue during the presidential campaign of the
governor of the state that furloughed him, Michael Dukakis. At one
point during the campaign, anti-Dukakis commercials flashing
Horton's mug shot were broadcast nationally to portray Dukakis as
"soft on crime." The commercials were controversial because of the
appeal to racial fear many thought implicit in flashing a mug shot of
an African-American man in connection with a crime story. Many
believed that this commercial played a role in Dukakis' defeat in the
167. See INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES 78 (1996).
168. The change approved in the bill which mandates a three-year state prison sentence
for anyone who "intentionally allows severe abuse to occur" makes the scope of the bill
even more alarming. Child-Abuse Measure Approved by the House, supra note 166, at 3A.
Standing idly by while a child got a tooth knocked out is also inexcusable, but an
automatic prison sentence for the watcher seems even less appropriate than for the
batterer.




Regardless of what role the Horton controversy played in the
outcome of the '88 presidential election, the case has shaped crime
policy in a way that is worth understanding. The lesson drawn by
most from Dukakis' difficulty defending his early support of the
furlough program was that a public official who sanctioned the
release of a potentially violent offender would never be able to justify
that decision in the event of a subsequent violent offense. In this
sense, the case established a mind set into which the subsequent crime
stories of Polly Klaas and Megan Kanka would be incorporated:
everything must be done to reduce the chances that violent offenders
will reoffend. The realization of this mind-set in sentencing policy has
emphasized long, mandatory sentences and the elimination of
parole.170
My purpose in this Part is to reveal the ways in which this mind-
set is intimately connected to our sense of punishment as a site for the
celebration of sacrosanct themes. Specifically, I will describe two
connections. First, the tendency to frame the release decision
primarily in terms of the risks of reoffense is a direct result of the
previously discussed tendency to conceive of abstract categories of
offense and offender in the worst possible terms. Second, our sense
of crime stories as sacred stories manifests itself in the rhetorical
supremacy of individual narratives about the suffering of crime
victims over statistical arguments about the probabilities of reoffense.
I will illustrate these connections through an analysis of the
circumstances and rhetoric of the Horton controversy, an analysis
that focuses on the ways in which prevailing rhetoric about criminal
justice policy obscures whose interests are really being served.
A. The Crimes of Willie Horton as a Sacred Story
The facts of Horton's crimes were terrible. While furloughed, he
raped, beat, robbed, and terrorized a Maryland couple named Angela
and Cliff Barnes.171 His original murder involved the stabbing death
170. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 23-24. For example,
the 1994 Federal Crime Bill tied federal monies to requirements that states require all or
almost all (85%) of their inmates to complete their full sentence. Actually, only 4% of the
most serious violent crimes known to police each year are committed by people on parole
or probation. See id.
171. I might not ordinarily identify by name the victims of such a lurid crime in a law
review article out of concerns about privacy, but the Barnes's became energetic public
campaigners during the furlough controversy, and an analysis of their advocacy forms a
central part of my argument in this Part.
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of an eighteen year old boy who was working at a gas station and who
offered no resistance during a robbery. Yet during the controversy
over the furlough issue, his original offense was grossly exaggerated,
and even his already terrible furlough offense was embellished
considerably. Furthermore, these offenses were exaggerated in ways
which touched on sacrosanct themes. A false rumor that Angela
Barnes was pregnant at the time of the assault was widely repeated.172
The most outrageous rumors concerned what Horton had done to the
murder victim in his original case, eighteen-year old Michael
Fournier. On the night of the murder, police witnesses had observed
that Fournier seemed to have fallen onto a waste paper basket as he
fell. "Yet by 1987 furlough opponents would declare with great
authority that Fournier's murderer had stuffed the body into an oil
drum or heaved it into a Dumpster,' 73 and one variation of this
rumor had his assailants hacking off the corpse's arms and legs before
its disposal. A second even more horrible rumor that was reported
widely by multiple public officials and media sources was that Horton
himself had sexually mutilated the eighteen year old boy. "'Horton
cut off the boy's genitals, put them in his mouth and then spit them
out' stated one legislator at a committee hearing."' 74 This charge was
subsequently repeated over and over again by a variety of
authoritative sources and acquired the stature of an unquestioned
truth immediately.175
Whereas Fourier's fall onto the wastepaper basket provides at
least some morsel of fact which might have served as a starting point
for the false rumors about his body's disposal, the sexual mutilation
rumor had no basis of any kind that anyone has ever been able to
identify. "It never happened, but for some reason it came up
somewhere along the line," according to one of the legislators active
in the campaign against the furlough program.176 In fact, autopsy
photographs established conclusively that Fournier was not even
stabbed in the lower part of his body; all of his injuries were above the
waist. 7
7
The exaggerations of Horton's prior crime extended to less lurid,
but more legally significant, distortions as well. Newspapers in
Massachusetts routinely reported that Horton had been convicted of
172. See ANDERSON, supra note 169, at 184.
173. Ud
174. Id.
175. See id. at 184-87.
176. Id. at 187.
177. See id. at 187-88.
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murder for stabbing Fournier.178 In fact, Horton was convicted on a
felony murder theory based on his participation in the robbery, and
according to the prosecutor who tried the case, "Three participated
but there was no way the jurors could determine which one of them
did the stabbing .... There was no evidence, no proof coming out of
the trial."'179 If one looks beyond what was admitted into evidence, it
seems unlikely that Horton was even present when the stabbing took
place. The case was originally broken when family members of one of
Horton's accomplices, A.A. Wideman, reported to police that
Wideman told them that while Horton and the other accomplice
waited in the car, Wideman had gone inside the gas station alone,
where he subsequently robbed and killed Fournier.1 80
David Anderson, a journalist who followed the Horton case as it
unfolded and who subsequently wrote a comprehensive account of
the controversy explained these exaggerations in terms that Social
Constructionists would find familiar. "[T]he story promoted by
furlough opponents required Horton as monster, a criminal larger
than life whose horrible deeds should have barred him from furloughs
forever.' 181 Despite the fact that Horton didn't really exist, victims
rights groups, media, and politicians that were pushing the issue
"seemed eager to create him."'1 82 Even more interesting, however,
was that "a fearful public just as eagerly believed in their creation. ' 183
Anderson attributed this eagerness to the need to project general fear
about crime and frustration with criminal justice onto something.
"Lacking a real point of focus, the general fear had brought forth its
own, an ugly hologram that hung in the air whenever the subject came
up, an image with the power finally to liberate bottled-up rage."184
B. The Furlough Program
From the outset, the most controversial aspect of Horton's latter
crimes was the fact that he had been serving a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this sense, Horton
was a poster child for all those who argued that criminal justice
178. See id. at 188.
179. Id. at 189. The prosecutor did believe that Horton did the stabbing because he
believed that the owner of the car stayed with the car and Horton and the other
accomplice went inside the gas station.
180. See id. at 71-75.





system was a rigged game for insiders where nothing could be taken
at face value. The idea that such an inmate was walking around in
society reinforced people's suspicions that the harsh prison sentences
handed down by judges were merely "for show" while offenders were
being let out the back door of the prison while no one was looking.
Indeed, this was one of the charges leveled against indeterminate
sentencing: the highly visible sentences pronounced by judges in
open court were rendered meaningless by the relatively low-visibility
decisions of parole officials who determined the actual sentence.
Horton's furlough suggested sentencing was still far less determinate
than what met the eye.185 Horton's furlough also seemed on its face
to defy the logic of a rehabilitative approach to punishment. What
was to be gained by weekend passes for someone who would never be
released back into society?
Breaking open the abstract category of "convicted first degree
murderer sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of
parole" and examining the type of offenders included within that
category clarifies the basic rationale for the furlough program under
which Horton was released. At a hearing before the Massachusetts
legislature conducted in the wake of Horton's furlough crimes, one
legislator who supported the program described the inmates
furloughed in the following way.
[Olver 60 percent of the lifers are first-time offenders. They have
committed no other crimes. This was their first offense. Many
lifers are felony murderers. They didn't do the killing. The lifers in
an institution are not the guys you hear about who are cutting up all
over the street. The typical offender in prison is between the ages
of nineteen and twenty-six. He has got a history of crime, a history
of drug abuse to a great extent. He is a bad actor. He doesn't get
too many rehab programs .... The lifer is about ten years older
than that. They live in the prison. It is theirs. That is where they
are for life, unless they get commuted .... They are the best-
behaved inmates in the prison.
86
The legislator also testified that many of the lifers had rehabilitated
185. This sense of justice as impermanent was expressed by many who spoke out after
Horton's crimes brought the furlough program into the public eye. Family members of
some of the original victims of the furloughed inmate's murders testified in compelling
terms. The mother of a slain son complained "[m]y son can never be alive again, not for
eight hours or even one second. If punishment is not for life, then where is justice?" The
mother of the teenager slain in Horton's original case told the committee "we felt that we
had been served by the judicial system.., what a shame it would be that he had to die for
nothing, because justice has not been served." Id at 171-72.
186. Id. at 169-70.
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while in prison as a result both of programs they had completed and
as a result of the passage of time. "He is not the same person at age
thirty-eight or forty as he was when he was nineteen."' 87
The same committee also heard testimony about the positive
things which many lifers did while on furlough: they spent time with
their families, did community service work, and in some cases had
even worked on construction crews that had been remodeling the
statehouse.188 One lifer, in particular, Omar Haamid Abjur-Rahim,
exemplified many of the most appealing aspects of the program: he
did not seem to belong in prison for life, and he used his furlough
time to the benefit of the community.
He said that in addition to visiting his family, he had spent furlough
time speaking to high school groups and to addicts in drug-
rehabilitation programs. He also made an instructive revelation:
He had participated in a robbery with another man who actually
did the shooting. Even so, Abdur-Rahim was charged with first-
degree murder under the felony murder law. Prosecutors offered
both men the chance to plead guilty to second-degree murder.
Abdur-Rahim refused the deal and went to trial, where the jury
found him guilty of murder in the first degree and therefore subject
to life without parole. But his accomplice accepted the deal and he
was sentenced to second-degree murder. Even though it was he,
not Abdul-Rahim, who had done the killing, he was already eligible
for parole.
89
Abdur-Rahim's case portrayed the furlough program as an
opportunity to allow the system to mitigate some unintended-and
perhaps unavoidable-consequences of the adversary system. A
defendant's recalcitrance in plea bargaining should obviously not
determine whether he someday is eligible for parole, and Abjur-
Rahim appeared manifestly to be a person who deserved parole.
Officials from the Governor's office also sought to place the
Horton offense in context. The furlough program had a success rate
of 99.5%. Furthermore, it played an important role in commutation
decisions in a state where commutation had a long tradition. "The
governor feels that the only way he can make a decision as to whether
or not a sentence should be commuted is if the person has some kind
of track record that he can look to."'90 One official described an
example where a furlough had enabled the Governor to commute the
187. Id. at 170.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 170-71.
190. Id. at 168-69.
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sentence of a deserving inmate.
A young man.., was eighteen years old when he was involved as
an accessory in a holdup of a restaurant .... He came from a very
good family, came from a family where in fact two of his brothers
were leading law-enforcement professionals. He had gone
joyriding with some friends who decided to hold up a restaurant.
When police arrived, another member of the group shot and killed
an officer .... This particular young person, although involved in
the holdup, didn't pull a trigger.... He was convicted and served
many years .... In prison he earned high school and college
degrees, learned trade skills.'91
The Governor's staff pointed out that parole of lifers in
Massachusetts was not a new experiment and provided a study
showing that seventeen of thirty-seven prisoners whose death
sentences had been commuted between 1898 and 1971 had been
paroled.
192
C. Framing the Release Decision in Terms of the Risks of Reoffense
The most vocal and most active opponents of the furiough
program were Cliff and Angela Barnes, the Maryland couple
victimized by Horton after he broke his furlough and fled
Massachusetts. They spoke about the risks of reoffense by
furloughed inmates. Angela Barnes, the woman who had been raped
by Horton, spoke of the committee's responsibility for future harms
to victims. "The next person that's hurt or killed [by a furloughed
lifer] -it's going to be on your blood, it's going to be on your soul,
every single one of you that let it happen.' 1 93 Cliff Barnes addressed
the use of statistics to justify the risk of furloughing the lifers: he was
enraged by the use of the 99.5% success rate statistic.
Are you saying that some people on this committee think if you use
figures and numbers,... it's acceptable? ... That's acceptable, so
we're .... By that system, we're expendable-is that what they're
saying that there's an acceptable statistic, an acceptable ratio, for
how many lives can be destroyed or damaged by these first-degree
convicted murderers? 9 4
In a revealing exchange, Barnes framed the committee's decision in
terms of an unsustainable burden of proof.
I think when you're dealing with people that are this dangerous and
191. Id. at 168-69.
192. See id at 168-69.
193. Id. at 173.
194. Id. at 173.
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this violent, anything short of 100 percent is not successful. I mean,
you can't get any guarantees that they're not going to harm
somebody else. They've already given up their rights when they kill
someone.
195
This single quote contained the two themes that subsequently defined
the debate and largely determined the outcome (the ultimate
cancellation of the program): first, risk of reoffense must be reduced
to zero; second, offenders interests were not to be weighed because
they had "given up their rights."
The rhetorical power of both of these themes bears examination.
The argument that offenders have "given up their rights" is the final
step of a three step move. First, you create a capacious category-
one that is loosely defined-such as first degree murderer. It is
loosely defined because it can include people who did not actually
kill. Second, our superheated crime talk assigns that category the
worst possible value in the abstract. Third, anyone who comes within
that category now can be presumed to have given up their rights.
"You have given up your rights when you kill someone. '196
The use of the word "rights" in the preceding statement also
bears scrutiny. I believe that "rights" is used here in a pejorative
sense-in the sense of a legal demand for an entitlement of some sort,
something which must be granted. With this sense of rights in mind, it
becomes easy to consider the idea of a "right" of a life-sentenced first
degree murderer to be a contradiction in terms: they have no
"rights."
This rhetorical inflection of the word "rights" masks the interests
which are actually being denied consideration. There is no question
of there being a "legal right" in the colloquial sense of a constitutional
or legal right to release from a life sentence for any period of time.
Furlough and parole decisions are matters of largely unreviewable
discretion. What is really being said here is that the interests of the
lifer are worth nothing. They have been "given up." Society should
not consider anything that would benefit them once they have come
within the category of lifer.
This hidden calculus of interests makes the first demand for a
guarantee of the furloughed lifers' good conduct irresistible. Implicit
in the idea that we should only accept zero risk of offense by
furloughed inmates is the assumption that no legitimate
countervailing interests exist, that the lifer has essentially lost his or
195. Id.
196. Id. at 173.
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her value as a human being. Risk assessment in any other context
always involves balancing some such countervailing interest. For
example, we could eliminate thousands of road deaths each year if we
unilaterally reduced highway speed limits in all areas by twenty miles
per hour, but we value the convenience and efficiency of speed as well
as the autonomy of those who would like to drive that fast. We could
reduce drunk driving fatalities if we made it a strict liability offense to
drive with any amount of alcohol in your bloodstream, but we attach
some value to drinking alcohol and to the autonomy of individuals
who wish to do so. Life is not of infinite importance to us as a society.
The demand for a hundred percent guarantee of safety for released
offenders resonates only because the interests of inmates has been
reduced to zero. They have been dehumanized. Since, there is
nothing to balance against the "risk of reoffense," that risk must be
reduced to zero, a reduction accomplished only by incarcerating
everyone as often as possible for as long as possible.
D. Statistics as a Denial of the Sacred
"Statistics" became a dirty word during the Horton controversy.
David Anderson said that "statistics" came to serve as a "code word
for softness on crime and callousness toward its victims" during this
time.197 In fact, "statistics" was used as a label to tarnish any who
sought to widen the frame from the individual case of Willie Horton
to the larger group of furloughed lifers. In an exchange on a
television program between the Barnes's and a woman who had been
a furlough sponsor for an inmate, for example, Barnes repeatedly
characterized the sponsor's concerns with the larger group of inmates
in the furlough program as being the product of some sort of
statistical or quantitative reasoning process.
If the purpose of the correctional system is to promote public
safety, she argued, then it makes no sense to get "rid of the entire
program because of one bad person."
Cliff Barnes immediately rose to the challenge: "So you use
statistics."
"Excuse me," the sponsor continued evenly. "The recidivism rate
for men who have been out on furlough is much lower-"
"So you use rates and ratios?" Cliff interjected. And Angela
chimed in: "Thank you. I'm a dispensable person. Thank you very
much."
197. Id at 201.
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"Absolutely not," the sponsor responded.
"That's what you're saying," Cliff shot back.
"Statistics only work in finances," Angela added.
The sponsor tried again: "It's very unfortunate that I find myself
arguing against your pain, which I really feel for.... And I don't
think anyone is arguing that what happened with William Horton
shouldn't have been prevented, and we all wish that it had been
prevented."
But Cliff was adamant. "How do you use statistics and ratios when
you're dealing with human lives? You're not talking about how
much your CDs yield. If he had killed us, would that have been
proof enough?"'198
Those characterizations resonated without further explanation
because they tapped into a deeper-yet seldom articulated-
sentiment about the role which statistical arguments play in criminal
justice debates. The irony of Cliff Barnes's claim that any use of
statistical reasoning made him and his wife "dispensable people" is
that the true "dispensable" people of the prevailing sentencing
mindset are not the Barnes or any other members of the public who
might some day come into contact with a furloughed lifer. The
interests of these people are weighed into the release decision in all
sorts of ways beginning with the guidelines determining eligibility of
release and continuing with the screening procedures which
determine who gets a furlough. The true "dispensable" people are
the lifers, a group which includes people now in their forties who in
their teens drove getaway cars at gas station holdups that turned
violent: they are dispensable because their interests receive no
consideration of any kind. In our contemporary discourse about
punishment, they became "dispensable people" when they became
included within the category "first degree murderer."
The hostility to statistical arguments in our crime talk reveals
something important about our attitudes toward punishment.
Statistics are virtually the only linguistic tool available for capturing
patterns in large and complex bodies of information. In rejecting
statistics, the American public is essentially rejecting information
about the criminal justice system. This rejection of aggregative
reasoning expresses more than just a colloquial distrust of the
complexities of statistical reasoning: "you can always lie with
statistics." The rejection of statistics as a justification for releasing
198. Id. at203.
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offenders is really a rejection of instrumental reasoning in matters of
punishment that touch upon our sense of the sacred. Statistical
arguments ultimately seek to place the crime narrative at issue into a
larger picture about how society works in order to resist the
temptation to distill a principle from what may be an isolated or
unrepresentative story. What gets weakened, however, is the
meaning of the original story. Telling the Barnes that their safety and
well-being was in fact traded off against the interests of hundreds of
lifers and their families does violate some sense of the sacred. It may
make sense, but it still seems wrong. That same tradeoff, however,
goes on in hundreds of civil courtrooms across the country when
product liability suits turn upon the costs of the extra repair which
might have prevented this particular accident. The use of cost-benefit
analyses in these contexts to defend design decisions often work with
juries. Punishment is different, however, because we look to
punishment to transcend costs and benefits, and when decisions are
framed in terms of tragic stories, we show our respect for the story in
the way we talk about-and thereby think about-the issues involved.
In the Horton controversy, we observe a specific rhetorical
pattern which allows the interests of offenders to be removed
completely from society's decisions about punishment: offenders of
widely ranging degrees of culpability are categorized in terms of
abstract offenses; those abstract categories are interpreted in the
worst terms possible in the public discourse; the interests of the
offenders are then valued at zero when decisions about release are
considered, permitting victim-advocates to insist upon absolute (and
thereby impossible to give) guarantees that the released offender will
never reoffend again. By eclipsing the interests of the offender
completely, this pattern of discourse generates the maximal amount
of solidarity possible around a philosophy of punishment which
ultimately frustrates society's deeper need for a system of punishment
which stands for something more than self-protection. It also
portrays the offender only in the monodimensional light of his
potential dangerousness to society and, in so doing, makes him
society's ultimate scapegoat. The rhetorical appeal of this strategy is
that it frames all attempts to look beyond the suffering of the crime
victim at the heart of the special crime story as instrumental forms of
reasoning which frustrate our search for transcendence through
punishment.
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V. The Challenges of Expressive Punishment in Durkheimian
Times
Nothing happened to me, Agent Starling. I happened. You can't
reduce me to a set of influences. You've given up good and evil for
behaviorism, Agent Starling. You've got everybody in moral
dignity pants-nothing is ever anybody's fault. Look at me, Officer
Starling. Can you stand to say I'm evil? 199
If I am correct in arguing that we are living through what might
be termed a long "Durkheimian Moment," a period of social history
when our punishment policies are greatly affected by our anxieties
about social solidarity, what does this Durkheimian perspective tell us
about how our society might best negotiate a course toward less
severe practices of punishment? In this Part I will offer some
preliminary observations. First, I will provide a summary and critique
of Expressive Punishment, a school of thought which touches upon
some of the same communicative dimensions of punishment as my
Durkheimian account. Second, I will argue that contemporary
hostility to indeterminate sentencing can best be understood as being
expressive of an anxiety about the lack of a determinate concept of
evil during a time of change and flux. The challenge of Expressive
Punishment is to find not just penalties but sentencing processes which
are themselves expressive of a vision of good and evil which is
sufficiently determinate to assuage anxieties about solidarity, yet
sufficiently flexible to facilitate the reintegration of the offender into
the society at the right time and in the right way.
A. Expressive Punishment
The principal author of Expressive Punishment as a school of
legal scholarship is Dan Kahan. He inaugurated Expressive
Punishment in an article arguing that alternative sanctions such as
probation had failed to dislodge incarceration as the punishment of
choice in contemporary times because alternative sanctions did not
express sufficient condemnation of certain types of behavior.20°
Kahan argued that one virtue of certain types of "shaming penalties"
which were coming into vogue was that they directly expressed such
condemnation. Shaming penalties are in this sense speaking penalties:
for example, the DWI offender who wears the sign around his neck is
199. Thomas Harris, THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS 21 (1989), quoted in DELBANCO,
supra note 90, at 19.
200. See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 43, at 63.
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allowing society to literally advertise its disapproval of his crimes. In
Kahan's view, a society which felt its values were being expressed
through the nature of the penalty would not feel as great a need to
express itself through the more severe penalty of incarceration.
This view of expressive punishment can be interpreted as a form
of what the novelist Tom Wolfe might call "steam control." In Tom
Wolfe's novel The Bonfire of the Vanities, a Harlem preacher
compares the inner city community where he works to a closed
system in which steam builds up to great pressures. He describes a
process of "steam control" whereby some of that pressure is allowed
to escape in order to avoid the explosion of the community into
violence and unrest. I am using steam control in this context to refer
to the build up of punitive pressures within society as a whole, and the
"explosion" which Kahan is seeking to avoid or reduce is the
explosive growth in incarceration. Kahan's project is to minimize the
mindless severity of contemporary punishment. He seems to see
alternative sanctions involving shaming punishment as playing the
role of a safety-valve role which releases the steam of society's moral
outrage. Shaming releases the pressure for prison that has built up in
a society which feels its values are not being sufficiently articulated
through punishment.
Expressive Punishment has attracted its share of criticism. First,
it has been criticized on theoretical grounds. Michael Tonry has
argued that shaming penalties treat the offender as an expendable
means to an illegitimate end, a sacrificial offering to the altar of
punitive public opinion.2 1 Second, Tonry and others have attacked
shaming on more pragmatic grounds. They have argued that shaming
penalties degrade the offender in ways which will make him more
deviant, ways which are not necessary to satisfy public opinion, and
ways which run the risk of coarsening public sensibilities about
punishment and thereby exacerbating-not alleviating-punitive
social pressures.202
To be sure, shaming penalties carry these risks. To the degree
that shaming penalties degrade the moral worth of offenders in the
public's eyes, they may lead to more incarceration, not less. Along
these lines it is worth remembering that executions in this country
were once public affairs. They were discontinued in part because of
the effect that they produced upon their audiences. Rather than
sacred rituals with an air of solemnity, public hangings in nineteenth
201. See Tonry, Rethinking, supra note 43.
202. See id.; Whitman, supra note 43.
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century America were rowdy, mobbish affairs where communal blood
lust seemed to be stirred up-not cathartically released.203 Indeed, to
the degree that society already seems predisposed to see crime and
criminals in the worst possible terms, penalties which convey a lack of
respect for the dignity of the offenders would seem to exacerbate a
dynamic which I have argued is fundamental to the current severity of
our punishments.
Shaming practices need not be interpreted primarily as a symbol
of degradation, however. Stephen Garvey has distinguished between
shaming penalties which perform an educative function-penalties
which focus attention on the shameful nature of the act committed-
and shaming penalties which merely insult and degrade the person
who committed the act.2°4 Garvey argues that educative shaming can
perform a valuable role while minimizing the degradation of the
individual in the eyes of the community. John Braithwaite has also
developed a concept of "Reintegrative Shaming, '205 a process which
Tonry has characterized in terms of the proper relationship between
parent and child.
Braithwaite's notion is that reactions to crime should
simultaneously express disapprobation and support, in much the
same way parents communicate to children that they have
misbehaved but that they are still loved. The "shaming"
ommunicates through disapproval the importance of the norms or
expectations that were violated but in a way that conveys respect
for the individual and concern for his or her well-being, and is
therefore "reintegrative." Reintegrative shaming proponents
contrast their approach with the destructive shaming of traditional
Western criminal justice systems that ostracize, alienate, and often
breed defiance or lead to rejection of prosocial norms and
attachment to antisocial ones.206
Nothing in Kahan's writings is inconsistent on a theoretical level
with either Garvey's approach or Braithwaite's. Whether some of the
practices which Kahan has described in his writings constitute the
"disintegrative shaming" which Tonry condemns is a dispute which I
will not attempt to resolve. Kahan, himself, has pointed out that
incarceration is a far more degrading penalty than the shaming
penalties which Tonry is criticizing.20 7 Rather than sacrificing the
203. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 97.
204. See Garvey, supra note 43.
205. See JOHN BRArrHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).
206. Tonry, Rethinking, supra note 43, at 1766.
207. See Kahan, Unthinkable Misrepresentations, supra note 43, at 1935.
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offender on the altar of opinion, Kahan is best understood as
exploring strategies for sparing him. The central point of his work has
clearly been to find ways to minimize incarceration that are
consonant with the political and social realities of public opinion, an
opinion which Kahan believes ultimately demands not severe
penalties but ones that are expressive of condemnation.208 Ultimately,
Kahan thinks that shaming penalties may throw water on the fires of
irrational severity; his critics fear that they throw kerosene on those
flames.
There is a deeper tension in this debate, however, which needs to
be revealed, one which can be usefully explored through the
anthropormorphic allusions which Tonry uses to describe functional
punishment policy making processes. Ultimately, Tonry sees punitive
pressures as emotions which policymakers need to meet with a
measure of detachment. He describes this detached approach in
terms of folk aphorisms. "'Don't take out your frustrations on your
child,' 'Sit down and count to ten,' and 'Write the angry letter today
but wait 'til tomorrow to send it."'2°9 Tonry wants society to master
its punitive emotions, not to simply express them unmediated by an
intervening period of cool reflection. Just as Kahan's earlier
writings2 10 may not have fully acknowledged the degree to which
condemnation can become addicting and lead not to a cathartic
release but to a desire for even greater condemnation- "the more I
yell the angrier I get"-Tonry may not be fully acknowledging the
difficulties and dangers of a "detached" approach to punishment.
First, to the degree that Durkheim is right about punishment's
spontaneous nature as an authentic reaction to violations of the
sacred, a punishment process which expresses detachment
unavoidably challenges the quality of the sacred as something that
cannot be reduced, weighed, or balanced but something which simply
demands its due. Indeed, the failure of criminologists and other
criminal justice experts to master the sacred stories of victim suffering
with their dispassionate statistical analyses suggests that detachment
may be the wrong posture to adopt in the face of passion. In folk
terms, passion-even irrational passion-is sometimes best tamed by
facilitating expression. When you tell someone who is agitated or
upset to simply "calm down," this often makes them more agitated
208. See id. at 1934; see also Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 43, at 653.
209. Tonry, Rethinking, supra note 43, at 1756.
210. In a recent article, Kahan has articulated fully his view of the dangers of "moral
zealoutry" in punishment discourse. See Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 16.
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because your detachment signals to them that you fail to comprehend
the enormity of that which is upsetting them. Asking a distraught
person to tell you what is the matter-to express what ails them-can
be a more productive way of getting them to calm down.
Ultimately, Tonry is right in saying that we want our punishment
to be a product of both emotion and reflection, but too much
detachment risks exacerbating punitive social pressures just as much
as does too much passion. Similarly, "Reintegrative Shaming" has its
own liabilities, ones which serve as mirror opposites of the ones which
have been identified with Disintegrative Shaming. Punishment that
reintegrates too quickly or too completely may not be "shaming
enough" to be expressive of society's condemnation. You don't want
to punish a child too quickly-before you have gotten your anger
under control-but you also don't want to forgive a child too
quickly-lest you undermine the message that what he did was wrong.
These observations are not offered to settle the debate, but to
establish that it is an important one that illuminates unavoidable
tensions in our approach to punishment. Indeed, in the sections
which follow I will argue that the indeterminate sentencing practices
of the sixties and seventies were rejected out of fear that they would
not express clearly the offender's responsibility for his wrongful acts.
In this sense, indeterminate sentencing practices expressed a view of
morality-and of evil-which was too indeterminate for a society
anxious about its solidarity.
Finally, an important caveat needs to be raised about Expressive
Punishment. To speak too readily about the expressiveness of
punishment is to run the risk of embracing too completely the
dichotomy between expression and thought, to unconsciously accept
the idea that society's moral values exist independently of their
expression and are not themselves shaped or, at the very least,
inflected by the process of their expression. It is to the nature of
those inflections, that I now turn.
B. The Difficulty of Expressive Punishment in Contemporary Times
Punishment speaks to society at many points during the criminal
justice process: the nature of the penalty chosen is not the only
expressive aspect of our punishment practices. The decision-making
process that leads up to the choice of a sentence has significant
expressive dimensions to it. For example, a sentencing process in
which victims are heard and given an opportunity to confront their
aggressors expresses something about the importance of the victim's
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loss. Furthermore, the nature of the sentencing process determines in
what sort of context the expressive meaning of the penalty chosen will
be interpreted. A full exposition of the nature of the offense and the
nature of the charge will provide a context that can moderate or
increase the need for condemnation in a particular case. In contrast,
a sentencing process which classifies offenses broadly in terms of
abstract legal categories and which characterizes offenders solely in
terms of prior criminal records robs the given sentence of a specific
context. In the absence of such a context, default conceptions of
offense and offender kick in, and I have argued at length that the
exaggerated nature of those default conceptions are born in anxieties
about social solidarity and have increased the severity of punishment.
A virtue of indeterminate sentencing practices was that they provided
some specific context; a vice of more determinate sentencing is that it
provides little or none.
The turn from indeterminate to determinate sentencing practices
can best be understood as a fear of context in sentencing. Previously,
I have argued that this move toward determinacy can be understood
in terms of an anxiety about the contestability of sentencing decisions
in terms of race. A parallel and mutually reinforcing explanation
frames that anxiety in terms of a more generalized concern about the
nature of our shared concepts of good and evil. Andrew Delbanco
has argued that Americans have traditionally relied heavily on very
determinate concepts of evil in order to negotiate moral issues within
their society.211 In early American culture "evil had a name, a face,
and an explanation. '212 The explanation of evil was the Fall of Man
and Original Sin: The personification of evil was the Devil. "When
American culture began, this devil was an incandescent presence in
most people's lives, a symbol and explanation for both the cruelties
one received and those perpetrated upon others. ' '213 Over time,
however, Delbanco argues that we lost not just a belief in the devil
but our confidence in a determinate concept of evil itself, and
"despite the shriveling of the old words and concepts, we cannot do
without some conceptual means for thinking about the sorts of
experiences that used to go under the name of evil. ' 214 Bereft of
shared words and symbols for evil, we have arrived at "an
211. See DELBANCO, supra note 90.
212. Id. at 4.
213. Id.
214. 1& at 9.
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unprecedented condition of inarticulate dread. '21 5 When we witness
terrible acts of inhumanity, we don't have a word we can comfortably
use for their cause. "So the work of the devil is everywhere, but no
one knows where to find him.
'216
Delbanco sees our desire for the simplifying power of a pure
conception of evil as expressing itself in popular culture's fascination
with the most terrible figures of evil. "As we lose touch with the idea
of evil, we seem to need more and more vivid representations of it-
as if it were a drug whose potency diminishes with each use. 2 17
Delbanco elaborates this theme by describing a recurring plot in
many contemporary crime novels. A sociopathic killer is hunted by a
liberal detective, psychiatrist, or other type of investigator. Initially,
the investigator struggles to understand the roots of the killer's lack of
empathy for human life. These roots usually lie in some sort of
gruesome childhood abuse. The real story of such novels is the liberal
investigator's journey from a sympathetic, reformist, or therapeutic
perspective to one that permits him to slay the monster before him
irrespective of the killer's origins. "The hunter is at first reluctant to
condemn this pathetic victim of someone else's cruelty but by the end
he rises to a murderous rage of his own. '218 Delbanco contrasts this
version of the liberal investigator with the "egghead scientist" of the
fifties science fiction movies who, in the name of science, foolishly
begs the military not to attack the alien monster.
In the old movies, this credulous fool is usually, after a perplexed
pause from the creature, vaporized or bludgeoned to death. But in
the new genre of horror fiction the good guy is more likely to
conclude after a struggle with himself that the police mentality is
right, that it is either the creature's life or his own.
219
I believe that at the root of the stories which Delbanco discusses
is a fear that knowledge of the world will disable us from protecting
ourselves from it, that the more nuanced one's view of humanity and
human behavior, the more likely one is to flinch from the acts
necessary for one's own survival. The liberal investigator in these
novels represents liberal society, and the fear is that our
understanding of the roots of criminal behavior in social inequalities
or in the pathological conditions of abuse which those conditions
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id at 17.
218. Id. at 18 ("[I]n an act of almost sexual relief he summons up his suppressed anger
and blows the bastard away.").
219. Id.
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sometimes engender will rob us of the will or the judgment to act in
our collective self-defense. In reliving over and over again a story
about a sensitive humane person who nonetheless brings himself to
kill, we are reassuring ourselves that we won't be killed ourselves.
The determinant turn in sentencing can be understood in similar
terms. The public has cast judges in criminal cases as "the liberal
investigator," and public support for more determinate forms of
sentencing can be understood as the expression of a fear that judges
were unable to identify evil when they saw it because of the moral
flux of contemporary times.220 This fear-and the more determinate
sentencing process which it has spawned-unfortunately forces the
judge to err on the side of seeing every defendant almost exclusively
in terms of the harm he has caused or might cause-to opt for the
hard reaction to evil in every case.
In a very real sense, the softhearted judge of the public's
imagination is the necessary counterpart to the monstrous offender.
The public needed an easy, reassuring explanation for why monsters
remain loose amongst us. The public did not want to believe that
there are no foolproof ways to detect and selectively incapacitate
monstrous offenders before they commit a monstrous crime. So, they
have invented a complement to the monstrous offender-the
softhearted judge. The softhearted judge is the well-meaning scientist
of the science fiction movies of the fifties. In the standard script, the
soft-hearted judge ignores the clear warning signs of future
dangerousness evident in the monstrous offenders past behavior and
pins society's hopes on the efforts of soft-hearted therapeutic
programs to transform a being who is plainly evil at his core.221
The mythical softhearted judge of the public's imagination was in
part a product of the indeterminate sentencing practices of the sixties
220. An interesting analogue to Delbanco's observations about popular fiction is the
controversy surrounding many of the recent nonfiction accounts of Hitler's life and early
influences. Each attempt to identify a set of influences which explain Hitler's murderous
hatreds is criticized on the ground that "understanding" Hitler brings us too close to
excusing him in some sense. Hitler clearly stands supreme as a transcendent symbol of
evil in the modern Western consciousness, and part of the hostility to attempts to "reduce"
him to a set of influences may flow from the same sorts of epistemological fears which
drive the American stories which Delbanco describes. See generally Ron Rosenbaum,
Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at 8
(book review); John Lukacs, The Hitler of History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at 26 (book
review).
221. For the difficulties in assessing which minor offender will go on to commit the next
major offense, see generally Mark H. Moore et al., Book Review: Dangerous Offenders
and Endangered Justice, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 81 (1988) (reviewing ROBERT
PANZARELLA, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF JUSTICE (1988).
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and seventies. Such practices made it easy for the public to believe
that judges were ignoring their values and needs. The greatest-and
most important-challenge for contemporary practices of punishment
is to find sentencing processes which develop an individualized
context for punishment decisions without reinforcing this myth and
the anxieties about social normlessness which correspond to it.
Conclusion
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
-W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming222
Yeats wrote this poem during revolutionary times. This stanza
has long been interpreted both as a reflection on the Russian
Revolution just past and an unconscious prophecy of the rise of
fascism to come,223 but it speaks powerfully to both the anxieties
about dissolution which any series of radical changes often produce as
well as to the extreme passions which often result. I believe that
jeremiads about the "Disuniting of America" are overstated: we have
never believed in a single falconer, and we don't need one now.
Radical changes are not the same thing as societal dissolution, but in
the midst of such changes many things do fall apart-old ways of
seeing gender roles, race relations, the history of the nation, the
definition of common values -and as a result it may seem "the center
cannot hold." The arresting trope of a disintegrating center speaks
directly to the inchoate fear that a society will fail to cohere, that it
will fail to enjoy the core of common values and outlooks around
which society's differing segments can coalesce. What is happening is
that the "center" of our society is moving. The inclusion of
historically subordinated groups and perspectives in the ongoing civic
debates of our day is shifting society's center, and to those attached to
the old ways, a shifting center feels very much like a disintegrating
222. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1920), reprinted in THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1973 (4th ed. 1979).
223. See id. at n.1.
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Anxieties about our shifting center have fueled and shaped the
severity revolution. Just as some have confused change with anarchy
and normlessness, many have confused anxieties about change with a
longing for the old ways. In the context of criminal justice, we have
confused a desire to make punishment more expressive of social
values with a desire to make punishment expressive of a harsh view of
humanity which subordinates morality to social control. The severity
revolution does not reflect the rejection of morally meaningful
practices of punishment by the public; it reflects anxiety about flux
and about social cohesion. The results of these anxieties, however,
have been sentences tied to monstrous conceptions of crime, a
sentencing process which attempts to measure only harm and not
moral worth, and a mentality of risk assessment which holds our
judges and prosecutors hostage to our worst fears. These are the
three intertwined strands of the severity revolution. If our
ceremonies of innocence have not drowned in a blood-dimmed tide,
they are bobbing dangerously in an ocean of fear. If they slip under
the surface, our anxieties about solidarity will enjoy more of a basis in
fact than they currently do.
Unraveling the strands of the severity revolution is a difficult
process to begin. The "passionate intensity" of those who advocate
longer sentences and more frequent incarceration, and demand
impossible guarantees of safety seems unchallengeable within the
context of the prevailing conceptions of crime as the work of
monsters. Some of these advocates speak with a sense of certainty
about human affairs which is as absolute as it is misconceived. We
are imprisoning legions of people who do not deserve or need to be
imprisoned and keeping others incarcerated for far longer than we
should. Unfortunately, we do not know, and no one ever can predict,
which ones should not be released. Moral punishment is always a
gamble. We can't know which of the thousands of minor offenders
will go on to commit the next headline-grabbing crime. People who
pretend that all of those minor offenders deserve a level of
incarceration appropriate only for the most blameworthy and most
dangerous are pretending to have a knowledge of things which are
not knowable. They can minimize the gamble of punishment only by
minimizing punishment's moral dimension as well, and all the
denunciatory measures and symbolic statements of the new severity
cannot mask that loss.
How can the "best" regain their "conviction" in times such as
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these? Modem punishment requires of society what Keats called
Negative Capability, the state of being "capable of being in
uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after
fact and reason. '224 Negative Capability in the context of modern
punishment means accepting that we cannot know the important
things with certainty: which offender will reoffend, who is truly
dangerous, who is capable of rehabilitation, and who really deserves
severe punishment. These decisions of course will not go away, and
adopting a formula of dogmatic lenience would be as futile and as
morally bankrupt as the present dogma of severity in all things, for all
people, at all times. But Negative Capability in punishment means
recognizing the "best" as those who do not pretend to know with
certainty. Lacking a measure of conviction about punishment is a
healthy emotional state for society, even if it is a slightly less
comfortable one during changing times.
Nietzsche once said that when you look into the abyss, the abyss
looks into you. In staring into the abyss of crime and the suffering it
causes, society has seen a reflection of its own anxieties, a picture of
itself distorted by the rippling effects of great changes during recent
times. This abysmal vision has reached deep into our psyche and has
changed punishment in ways that divide us even more. We may not
be able to slay our monstrous conceptions of crime until the anxieties
that gave them birth have themselves abated. Undoing the work of
the severity revolution might begin only when our sense of society's
center stabilizes once again. In this sense, the solution to the severity
revolution may lie outside of law and punishment itself. It is also
possible, however, that efforts to develop legal practices which make
punishment more expressive of moral values without conjuring up
self-deceptive scapegoats might help an insecure society to edge its
way back from an abyss of its own imagination. The development of
such practices is, perhaps, the most important work to be done in
contemporary punishment.225
224. Letter from John Keats to George and Tom Keats (Dec. 21, 1817), in LETTERS OF
JOHN KEATS, at 43 (Robert Gittings ed., Oxford University Press 1979).
225. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic
or Utopian, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1727 (1999) (arguing that Restorative Justice holds the
greatest prospect of a less punitive criminal justice regime); Stephen P. Garvey,
Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999) (offering a vision of punishment
as a forum for "secular penance" and reconciliation with the victim and community).
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